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Abstract 
The Kuznets-Kaldor stylized facts are one of the most striking empirical regularities of the 
development process in industrialized countries: While massive factor reallocation across 
technologically distinct sectors takes place, the aggregate ratios of the economy are quite 
stable. This implies that cross-technology factor reallocation has a relatively weak impact 
on the aggregates, which is a puzzle from a theoretical point of view. We provide a model 
which can explain the Kuznets-Kaldor-puzzle by independent preferences and 
technologies. Furthermore, we show by empirical evidence that this explanation is in line 
with 55% of structural change in the USA between 1948 and 1987. 
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1. Introduction 
As shown by Kongsamut et al. (1997, 2001), the development process of 
industrialized countries over the last century satisfies two types of stylized facts: 
“Kuznets facts” and “Kaldor facts”.  
Generally speaking, “Kuznets facts” state that strong structural change takes place 
during the development process.1 Especially, in the early stages of economic 
development production factors are primarily reallocated from the agricultural 
sector to the industrial sector and in later stages of development factors are 
primarily reallocated from the manufacturing sector to the services sector. (It has 
also been shown that structural change takes place at more disaggregated level.)  
On the other hand, “Kaldor facts” state that some key aggregate measures of the 
economy are quite stable during the development process; especially, the aggregate 
capital-to-output ratio and the aggregate income shares of capital and labour are 
quite stable, whereas the aggregate capital-to-labour ratio increases (at a fairly 
constant rate).2 That is, the growth process seems to be “balanced” at the aggregate 
level.  
As discussed by Kongsamut et al. (2001) and Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008), the 
coexistence of Kuznets and Kaldor facts seems to be a puzzle, since strong factor-
reallocations across sectors imply, in general, that Kaldor-facts are not satisfied 
(“unbalanced” growth of aggregates). Therefore, we name the empirically 
observable coexistence of Kuznets and Kaldor facts “Kuznets-Kaldor-puzzle”. 
The literature which deals with the Kuznets-Kaldor-Puzzle (more or less explicitly) 
includes Kongsamut et al. (1997, 2001), Meckl (2002), Foellmi and Zweimueller 
(2008), Ngai and Pissarides (2007), Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) and Boppart 
(2010). As discussed in detail by Stijepic (2011), we learn from this literature that 
                                                 
1 Papers that provide empirical evidence for the massive labor reallocation across sectors during the 
growth process are e.g. Kuznets (1976), Maddison (1980), Kongsamut et al. (1997, 2001) and Ngai 
and Pissarides (2004). Kongsamut et al. (1997, 2001) formulate the following stylized facts of 
structural change for the last hundred years: 1.) the employment share of agriculture decreases 
during the growth process; 2.) the employment share of services increases during the growth 
process; 3.) the employment share of manufacturing is constant. Ngai and Pissarides (2007) note 
that the development of the manufacturing employment-share can be regarded as “hump-shaped” in 
the longer run. 
2 In detail, Kaldor’s stylized facts state that the growth rate of output per capita, the real rate of 
return on capital, the capital-to-output ratio and the income distribution (between labour and capital) 
are nearly constant in the long run; capital-to-labour ratio increases in the long run. It is widely 
accepted that these facts are an accurate shorthand description of the long run growth process (at the 
aggregate level) in industrialized countries. A discussion of these facts can be found in the paper by 
Kongsamut et al. (1997, 2001) and in the books by Maußner and Klump (1996) and Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (2004). 
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the solution of the Kuznets-Kaldor-Puzzle in neoclassical growth frameworks 
requires, in general, the use of some knife-edge conditions. In fact, all papers used 
very severe restrictions to solve the Kuznets-Kaldor-Puzzle: all of them omitted 
some structural change determinants (which is the same as imposing some implicit 
knife-edge conditions) and/or imposed some explicit knife-edge parameter 
restrictions (like Kongsamut et al. (1997, 2001) and Meckl (2002)). Such (implicit 
and explicit) knife-edge conditions are severe restrictions, if their validity is not 
proven by empirical and/or theoretical reasoning. For an extensive discussion of 
these aspects see Stijepic (2011); for a discussion of structural change determinants 
see the next section. 
We include all key structural change determinants into analysis and analyze 
whether the knife-edge conditions, which are required for the solution of the 
Kuznets-Kaldor-Puzzle, are empirically reasonable. Furthermore, we point to a 
possible theoretical micro-foundation of these knife-edge conditions. 
The starting point of our analysis is the following fact: The key challenge to 
solving the Kuznets-Kaldor-Puzzle is already known since Baumol (1967): If 
production technology differs across sectors, the reallocation of factors across 
sectors causes unbalanced growth, i.e. Kaldor-facts are not satisfied.  
Then, we approach as follows: 
First, we show that Kaldor facts can be satisfied when factors are reallocated 
across technologically distinct sectors. In this sense our results postulate that 
structural change across technology can be “irrelevant” regarding the development 
of aggregate ratios. We name this type of structural change “neutral structural 
change”. (Of course, the existence of neutral structural change requires some knife-
edge conditions, which will be analyzed below, in our model.) Previously, Ngai 
and Pissarides (2007) have shown that neutral structural change can arise when all 
sectors have the same capital-intensity. However, Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) 
have shown that their results do not hold if capital-intensities differ across sectors, 
i.e. they show that in this case growth is, in general, unbalanced. In some sense, our 
result contradicts Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008), since neutral structural change 
arises despite the fact that capital-intensities differ across sectors in our model. We 
are able to obtain our results, since, in contrast to Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008), 
we assume a utility function that has non-unitary price elasticity of demand (i.e. 
each good has its own specific price elasticity) and since we assume that at least 
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one of the three sectors uses two technologies. (As we will discuss in our essay, the 
latter assumption is consistent with empirical evidence, which postulates that, e.g., 
the services sector is quite technologically heterogeneous.) Furthermore, in contrast 
to Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008), we model sectors which feature non-constant 
output-elasticities of inputs. 
Second, we study the empirically observable patterns of structural change and 
analyze whether they were neutral or non-neutral. In this sense, we analyze 
implicitly whether the knife-edge conditions, which ensure the satisfaction of the 
Kuznets-Kaldor-facts in our model, are given in reality. We develop an index of 
neutrality of structural change and show with the data for the US between 1948 and 
1987 that about 55% of structural change was neutral structural change. Hence, 
neutrality of structural change seems to be a relatively large explanatory variable 
regarding the Kuznets-Kaldor-puzzle. We show as well that this result applies to 
the most of the previous literature, implying that the previous literature can explain 
(maximally) 55% of structural change over the observation period. 
Third, we show that low (no) correlation between preference parameters and 
technology parameters can explain the prevalence (existence) of neutral structural 
change in reality (our model).3 We also suggest that the assumption of uncorrelated 
preferences and technologies may be theoretically reasonable in long run growth 
models. In this sense, the independency between preferences and technologies can 
be a theoretical foundation of the knife-edge conditions which are necessary for the 
solution of the Kuznets-Kaldor-Puzzle. 
In the next section (section 2) we provide some evidence on sectoral structures 
which are observed in reality, in order to provide an empirical basis for our 
discussion and model assumptions. Then, in section 3, we provide a PBGP-model 
of structural change in order to show the existence of neutral structural change; we 
also generalize some of the model results in Proposition 4 of this section. Section 4 
is dedicated to the empirical analysis, where among others we develop an index of 
neutrality of structural change and analyze the cross-capital-intensity structural 
change patterns in detail. In section 5 we discuss the assumption of low correlation 
between technology and preferences. Finally, in section 6 we provide some 
concluding remarks and hints for further research. 
                                                 
3 It should be noted here that previously it has been mentioned by Foellmi and Zweimueller (2008) 
that some type of independency between technology and preferences may be useful for generating 
aggregate balanced growth. However, this topic has not been studied further by them. 
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2. Stylized facts of sectoral structures 
2.1 Stylized facts regarding cross-sector-heterogeneity in 
production-technology 
Empirical evidence implies the following stylized facts of sectoral production 
functions: 
1. TFP-growth differs across sectors. Empirical evidence implies that TFP-growth-
rates differ strongly across sectors. For example, Bernard and Jones (1996) (pp. 
1221f.), who analyze sectoral TFP-growth in 14 OECD countries between 1970 
and 1987, report that, e.g., the average TFP-growth rate in agriculture (3%) was 
more than three times as high as in services (0.8%). Similar results are obtained by 
Baumol et al. (1985), who report the TFP-growth-rates of US-sectors between 
1947 and 1976. 
2. Capital intensity differs across sectors. Empirical evidence implies that factor-
shares in income differ strongly across sectors (hence, capital intensities differ 
strongly across sectors as well4). For example, Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (1997) 
provide evidence for the USA for the period 1959-1994. Their data implies that, for 
example, the labour income share was relatively high in manufacturing and 
construction (around 70%) in this period. At the same time, e.g. the labour income 
share in agriculture, finance, insurance and real estate was relatively low (around 
20%). Similar results for the USA are obtained by Close and Shulenburger (1971) 
for the period 1948-1965 and by Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) for the period 
1987-2004. Some new evidence for the USA (presented by Valentinyi and 
Herrendorf (2008)) supports these results as well. Gollin (2002) (p. 464) analyzes 
the data from 41 countries reported in the U.N. National Statistics. He confirms 
that factor income shares vary widely across sectors. 
 
A model which analyzes structural change across sectors should be consistent with 
these “stylized” facts of sectoral production functions. This is especially important, 
since these stylized facts have an impact on structural change (and hence on 
aggregate balanced growth), as we will see now.  
 
 5
2.2 Structural change determinants 
We name the attributes of preferences and technologies which cause structural 
change and determine its strength “structural change determinants”. A detailed 
discussion of these determinants (especially empirical evidence) is provided by, 
e.g., Schettkat and Yocarini (2006). We provide here a different overview and 
some newer references, since they are important for the following discussion. 
There a four main determinants of structural change.  
 
1. Non-homothetic preferences (inter-sectoral differences in income-elasticity of 
demand) – relevance for structural change analyzed empirically and theoretically 
by, e.g., Kongsamut et al. (1997, 2001). 
2. Differences in TFP-growth across sectors – empirical relevance for structural 
change shown, e.g., by Baumol (1967); theoretical relevance for structural change 
shown by, e.g., Ngai and Pissarides (2007). 
3. Differences in capital intensities across sectors – relevance for structural change 
analyzed empirically and theoretically by, e.g., Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008). 
4. Shifts in intermediates production across sectors – relevance for structural 
change analyzed empirically and theoretically by, e.g., Fixler and Siegel (1998). 
 
These four determinants generate structural change and determine strength and 
direction of structural change. Since the aggregate economy is the weighted 
average of its sectors, the aggregate behaviour depends on the structural change 
patterns. Thus, all four structural change determinants influence the behaviour of 
the aggregate economy. Hence, only if we include all four structural change 
determinants into a model, we can adequately analyse why balanced growth of 
aggregates (Kaldor-facts) can coexist with structural change. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
4 If labour income shares (or: output elasticities of labour) differ across sectors, capital intensities 
differ across sectors as well, since optimal capital intensity is determined by factor prices and by 
output elasticities of capital and labour. We will see later that this is true within our model. 
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3. Model of neutral structural change  
3.1 Model assumptions 
3.1.1 Production 
In the following we discuss a long-run multi-sector Ramsey-model. In fact, this 
model is the same as the one-sector Ramsey-model beside the fact that multiple 
consumption-goods-sectors are added to the model structure in neoclassical 
fashion. This sort of model is used in newer structural change literature, especially 
by Kongsamut et al. (1997, 2001), Ngai and Pissarides (2007) and Acemoglu and 
Guerrieri (2008).  
We assume an economy where two technologies exist (the model could be 
modified such that it includes more technologies; the key results would be the 
same). The technologies differ by capital intensity (i.e. output elasticities of inputs 
differ across technologies) and by total factor productivity (TFP) growth. TFP-
growth rates are constant and exogenously given. Goods ni ,...1=  are produced in 
the economy. Goods  are produced by using technology 1 and goods 
 are produced by using technology 2 ( . We assume that three 
inputs are used for production: capital (K), labour (L) and intermediates (Z). All 
capital, labour and intermediates are used in the production of goods . The 
amount of available labour grows at constant rate ( ). Since we want to model 
TFP-growth, we assume Hicks-neutral technological progress. It is well known that 
the existence of a balanced growth path in standard balanced growth frameworks 
requires the assumption of Cobb-Douglas production function(s) when 
technological progress is Hicks-neutral. (Later, we will see that the aggregate 
production function “inherits” the attributes of sectoral production functions along 
the PBGP, i.e. the aggregate production function is of type Cobb-Douglas.) These 
assumptions imply the following production functions: 
mi ,...1=
nmi ,...1+= )mn >
ni ,...1=
Lg
(1)  miZzKkLlAY iiii ,...1,)()()( == γβα
where .;0,,;1 constg
A
A
A ==>=++
&γβαγβα  
(2)  nmiZzKkLlBY i
v
iii ,...1,)()()( +== μχ
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where  denotes the output of good i;  and  denote respectively the fraction 
of labour, capital and intermediates devoted to production of good i; 
iY ii kl , iz
K  is the 
aggregate capital;  aggregate labour; L Z  aggregate intermediate index. Note that 
we omit here the time index. Furthermore, note that the index i denotes not sectors 
but a good or a group of similar goods. We will define sectors later. 
Of course, it is not “realistic” that there are only two technologies and that some 
goods are produced by identical production functions. However, every model 
simplifies to some extent and it is only important that the simplification does not 
affect the meaningfulness of the results. Our assumption is only a “technical 
assumption”, which is necessary to make our argumentation as simple as possible. 
Our key arguments (namely the existence of neutral structural change) could also 
be derived in a framework where each good is produced by a unique production 
function. (We show this fact in Proposition 4.) However, it would be much more 
difficult to formulate the independency assumptions (which are formulated in the 
next subsection). Instead of the simple restrictions, which we use in the next 
subsection, we would have to derive complex restrictions which would not be such 
transparent. Anyway, later our focus will be on the analysis of only three sectors 
(which are aggregates of the products i=1,…n); thus, two technologies are 
sufficient to generate technological heterogeneity between these three sectors. In 
this sense, we have introduced technological diversity into our framework in the 
simplest manner (by assuming that there are only two technologies).  
It may be easier to accommodate with our assumption of only two technologies by 
imagining that an economist divides the whole set of products of an economy into 
two groups (a technologically progressive and a technologically backward) and 
estimates the average production function for the two groups. Such approaches are 
prominent in the literature: e.g. Baumol et al. (1985) and Acemoglu and Guerrieri 
 8
(2008) approach in similar way in the empirical parts of their argumentation. 
Furthermore, note that much of the new literature on the Kuznets-Kaldor-puzzle 
assume very similar sectoral production functions (e.g. Kongsamut et al. (2001) 
and Ngai and Pissarides (2007)) or assume even identical sectoral production 
functions (e.g. Foellmi and Zweimueller (2008)). Hence, our assumption of only 
two (completely distinct) technologies is an improvement in comparison to some 
previous literature. Note that the empirical study of our paper (section 4) uses the 
more general assumption, i.e. each good is produced by a unique production 
function. 
We assume that all goods can be consumed and used as intermediates. 
Furthermore, we assume that only the good m can be used as capital. (Note that the 
model could be modified such that more than one good is used as capital e.g. in the 
manner of Ngai and Pissarides (2007).) This assumption implies: 
(5) mihCY iii ≠∀+= ,  
(6)  KKhCY mmm δ+++= &
where  denotes consumption of good i; iC δ  denotes the constant depreciation rate 
of capital;  is the amount of good i which is used as intermediate input. ih
We assume that the intermediate-inputs-index Z is a Cobb-Douglas function of ’s 
which is necessary for the existence of a PBGP (see Ngai and Pissarides 2007): 
ih
(7)  ∏
=
=
n
i
i
ihZ
1
ε
where  ∑
=
=∀>
n
i
ii i
1
1;,0 εε
 
3.1.2 Utility function 
We assume the following utility function, which is quite similar to the utility 
function used by Kongsamut et al. (1997, 2001): 
 
(8) ,     ∫∞ −=
0
1 ),...( dteCCuU
t
n
ρ 0>ρ  
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(11)  ∑
+=
=
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i
1
0θ
where U denotes the life-time utility of the representative household and iω , iθ  
and ρ  are constant parameters. In contrast to the model by Ngai and Pissarides 
(2007), the assumption of logarithmic utility function (equation (9)) is not 
necessary for our results, i.e. we could have assumed a constant intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution function of the consumption composite in equation (9). 
We can see that this utility function is based on the Stone-Geary preferences. 
Without loss of generality we assume that iθ s are not equal to zero and that they 
differ across goods i. The key reason for using this utility function is that it features 
non-unitary income-elasticity of demand and, especially, non-unitary price-
elasticity of demand. That is, income elasticity of demand differs across goods and 
price-elasticity of demand differs across goods (as long as iθ  differ across goods). 
For example, the good i=4 has another price elasticity of demand than good i=7 
(provided that 74 θθ ≠ ). Due to this feature, we can determine price elasticity and 
income elasticity for groups of goods. For example, by setting the iθ  in a specific 
pattern we can determine that the (average) price elasticity of demand for goods 
i=7,…14 is larger than for goods i= 56,…79. 
This is the key to our argumentation about preference and technology correlation 
later: By setting parameter restrictions (10) and (11) we determine that 
1.) on average, the income elasticity of demand for technology-1-goods is not 
larger or smaller in comparison to the income elasticity of demand for technology-
2-goods 
2.) on average, the price-elasticity of demand for technology-1-goods is not larger 
or smaller in comparison to the price-elasticity of demand for technology-2-goods; 
i.e. elasticity of substitution between technology-1-goods and technology-2-goods 
is equal to one. 
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Hence, preferences and technologies are not correlated on average. This means for 
example, that demand for some of the goods which are produced by technology 1 
can be price-inelastic and for some of the technology-1-goods price-elastic, while 
at the same time the demand for some goods which are produced by technology 2 
can be price-elastic and for some of the technology-2-goods price inelastic. 
However, on average, the elasticity of substitution between technology-1-goods 
and technology-2-goods is equal to unity. 
This restriction (equations (10) and (11)) reduces the generality of our model. 
Nevertheless, for our further argumentation it does not matter. It is simply a 
technical assumption in order to show in the simplest manner the existence of 
neutral structural change. That is, due to this assumption we can pursue our 
analysis along a PBGP, which is technically simple. Without this assumption, we 
would have to numerically solve the model and the distinction between neutral and 
non-neutral structural change would be quite difficult. Nevertheless, we will 
discuss the theoretical reasonability of this restriction later and we will show 
empirically that the largest part of structural change is in line with this restriction.  
Overall, our utility function allows for structural change caused by all structural 
change determinants: In general the goods have a price elasticity of demand which 
is different from one (as discussed above). Hence, changing relative prices can 
cause structural change in this model (see also Ngai and Pissarides 2007 on price 
elasticity and structural change). Intertemporal elasticity of substitution differs 
across goods i and is not equal to unity, despite of the fact that equation (9) is 
logarithmic. Equations (8)-(11) imply that the utility function is non-homothetic 
across goods i, i.e. income elasticity of demand differs across goods i (depending 
on the parameterization of the iθ ’s).  
 
3.1.3 Aggregates and sectors 
We define aggregate output (Y), aggregate consumption expenditures (E) and 
aggregate intermediate inputs (H) in the standard-way: 
(12) ;       ;          ∑
=
≡
n
i
iiYpY
1
∑
=
≡
n
i
iiCpE
1
∑
=
≡
n
i
iihpH
1
where  denotes the price of good i. We chose the good m as numéraire, hence: ip
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(13)  1=mp
Note that in reality the manufacturing sector is not the numéraire in the real GDP 
calculations. Hence, our definition of aggregate output Y is not the same as real 
GDP. However, the choice of numéraire is irrelevant when discussing ratios or 
shares (see e.g. Ngai and Pissarides (2004, 2007)), since the numéraire of the 
numerator and the denominator of a ratio offset each other. Therefore, we focus our 
discussion on the shares and ratios in our paper (e.g. aggregate capital-intensity, 
capital-to-output ratio, income-share of capital and labour), where the numéraire 
choice is irrelevant. Our results regarding the other Kaldor-facts, which are dealing 
with the development of the real-GDP-growth rate and the real interest rate, should 
be considered with caution. However, as discussed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(2004), the constancy of the real interest rate (as a Kaldor fact) may anyway be 
questionable; see Ngai and Pissarides (2007). Furthermore, as shown by Ngai and 
Pissarides (2004, 2007) the real GDP as measured in reality behaves in similar way 
as real GDP in manufacturing terms. Therefore, to some extent our results may be 
relevant for real GDP as measured in reality. 
Last but not least we have to define the sectors of our economy. Without loss of 
generality we assume here that there are three sectors which we name for reasons 
of convenience (according to the tree sector hypothesis): agriculture, 
manufacturing and services. Furthermore, without loss of generality we assume the 
following sector division  
• agricultural sector includes goods maai <<= 1;,...1  
• manufacturing sector includes goods nsmsai <<+= ;,...1  
• services sector includes goods nsi ,...1+= . 
Hence, the agricultural sector uses only technology 1, the manufacturing sector 
uses technology 1 and 2 and the services sector uses only technology 2. Note that 
this whole division is not necessary for our argumentation, neither the naming of 
the sectors. We could also assume that the capital-producing manufacturing sector 
uses only one technology (and the services sector both technologies). We could 
even assume that there are more sectors (and more technologies). In all these cases 
our key results would be the same. Furthermore, note that the assumption that a 
sector uses both technologies is plausible. For example, the service sector includes 
services which feature high TFP-growth and/or high capital intensity, e.g. ICT-
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based services, as well as services which feature low TFP-growth and/or low 
capital intensity, e.g. some personal services like counselling and consulting (for 
discussion and empirical evidence see e.g. Baumol et al. 1985 and Blinder 2007). 
Similar examples can be found in the manufacturing sector (e.g. a traditional clock 
maker vs. a car producer). Furthermore, our sector-division implies that only the 
manufacturing sector produces capital. This is consistent with the empirical 
evidence which implies that most capital goods are produced by the manufacturing 
sector (see, e.g., Valentinyi and Herrendorf 2008). 
According to our classification, we can define the outputs of the agricultural, 
services and manufacturing sector ( ,  and ) and the consumption 
expenditures on agriculture, manufacturing and services ( ,  and ) as 
follows: 
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Furthermore, note that employment shares ( ,  and ), capital shares 
( ,  and ) and intermediate shares ( ,  and ) of sectors 
agriculture, manufacturing and services are given by: 
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3.2 Model equilibrium 
3.2.1 Optimality conditions 
We have now specified the model completely. The intertemporal and intratemporal 
optimality conditions can be obtained by maximizing the utility function (equations 
(8)-(11)) subject to the equations (1)-(7) and (12)-(16) by using e.g. the 
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Hamiltonian. When there is free mobility of factors across goods and sectors these 
(first order) optimality conditions are given by: 
 
(17) i
h
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where  and mm Cuu ∂∂≡ /(.) )(/ KkYr mm ∂∂≡  is the real interest rate (see 
APPENDIX A for proofs). We show in APPENDIX A that these are the sufficient 
conditions for an optimum (together with the transversality condition). 
 
3.2.2 Development of aggregates in equilibrium 
To be able to derive some theoretical arguments from the model, we have to insert 
equations (1) to (16) into optimality conditions (17) to (19) in order to transform 
the optimality conditions into some explicit functions of model-variables and 
model-parameters. To get an impression of how this is done, see the model by 
Stijepic and Wagner (2012) (see there APPENDIX A). Therefore, we present the 
following equations, which describe the optimal aggregate structure of the 
economy, without explicit proof: 
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Note that G grows at positive constant rate, q is positive and 1<ε .5
Equations (20)-(28) look actually more complicated than they are. As we will see 
soon they are quite the same as in the standard one-sector Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans-model6 or Solow-model. The key difference is that our equations 
feature the term , which reflects the impact of cross-capital intensity 
structural change on the development of aggregates. However, before discussing 
mm kl /
                                                 
5 The term within the {}-brackets in equation (28) grows at constant positive rate since ε  is 
positive and smaller than one (see equation (29)). Furthermore, the exponent of the {}-brackets is 
positive as well, since 1)1( <+− εμεγ  (a weighted average of numbers that are smaller than one 
(γ  and μ ) is always smaller than one). As well, q>0, since 1)1( <+− εμεγ . 
6 For a discussion of the Ramsey-model see e.g. Barro, Sala-i-Martin (2004) pp. 85ff. 
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these facts we start with our definition of a dynamic-equilibrium growth path 
which is quite similar to the definition used by Ngai and Pissarides (2007). 
 
Definition 1: A partially balanced growth path (PBGP) is an equilibrium growth 
path where aggregates (Y, Y~ , K, E and H) grow at a constant rate. 
 
Note that this definition does require balanced growth for aggregate variables. 
However, it does not require balanced growth for sectoral variables (e.g. for 
sectoral outputs). Hence, it allows for structural change. 
 
Lemma 1: Equations (20) to (28) imply that there exists a unique PBGP, where 
aggregates (Y, Y~ , K, E and H) grow at constant rate  and where  is 
constant. The PBGP-growth rate is given by 
*g mm kl /
L
BA gggg ++−
+−= χεγαεμ
εγεμ
)1(
)1(* .  
Proof: See APPENDIX B. 
 
Proposition 1: a) A saddle-path, along which the economy converges to the PBGP, 
exists in the neighbourhood of the PBGP. b) If intermediates are omitted (i.e. if 
0== μγ ), the PBGP is locally stable. 
Proof: See APPENDIX C. 
 
Proposition 1 ensures that the economy will approach to the PBGP even if the 
initial capital level is not such that the economy starts on the PBGP. 
 
Proposition 2: The aggregate dynamics of the economy along the PBGP are 
represented by the following equations: ; EKKY ++= δ&ˆ qq KLGY −= 1~ˆ  and 
ρδλ −−=
K
Y
E
E ˆ& , where G~  is an auxiliary variable growing at constant rate (a 
sort of “Hicks-neutral technological progress”), Yˆ  denotes aggregate output 
without intermediates production (i.e. Y-H) and λ  is a constant auxiliary variable 
(see APPENDIX B for details of auxiliary variables).  
Proof: See APPENDIX B. 
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In fact Proposition 2 implies that the aggregate structure of our economy is quite 
the same as the structure of the standard Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans- or Solow-model 
(with Cobb-Douglas production function and logarithmic utility). 
Now, the question arises, whether structural change takes place along the PBGP. 
We discuss this question in the following. 
 
3.2.3 Development of sectors in equilibrium 
The following equations, which describe the optimal sector structure of the 
economy (represented by employment shares), can be obtained by inserting 
equations (1) to (16) into optimality conditions (17) to (19): 
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Again, to get an impression of how these equations can be derived, see the 
derivations in Stijepic and Wagner (2012) (especially APPENDIX A). 
Note that ... ,, sermanagr ΛΛΛ  and Γ  can be easily derived as functions of exogenous 
parameters along the PBGP.7 However, we omit here the explicit proof, since it is 
trivial and irrelevant for further discussion (for a sketch of the proof see footnote 
7). 
 
Lemma 2: Structural change takes place along the PBGP. That is, the employment 
shares of sectors agriculture ( ), manufacturing ( ) and services (  
change over time along the PBGP. 
.agrl .manl .serl )
Proof: This Lemma is implied by equations (30) and (31). Note that , 
and  are constant along the PBGP (due to Lemma 1); 
.. , managr ΛΛ
.serΛ Y~  grows at rate  
along the PBGP (see Lemma 1). 
*g
Γ  decreases at constant rate along the PBGP. The 
latter fact comes from Lemma 1 and equation (28). Note that G/A grows at positive 
constant rate; see equation (28) and footnote 5. Furthermore, note that the exponent 
εμγε
εεμβ
−−(−
+−+ )11
)1( v
v  is positive, since 1)1( − + εμ <εγ  as explained in footnote 5. Q.E.D. 
 
Now, the remaining exercise is to show that along the PBGP our model is indeed 
consistent with all the stylized facts mentioned in the introduction and section 2 of 
our paper. 
                                                 
7 In APPENDIX B (equation (B.17)) we have derived  as function of exogenous model 
parameters. This function can be used to derive 
mm kl /
Y~  and Y  as functions of exogenous model 
parameters by using equations (21) and (25). Then, when we have Y~  and  as functions of 
exogenous model parameters, we can derive 
mm kl /
H  as a function of exogenous model parameters by 
using equation (23). Finally, we can use Y and H to derive E as function of exogenous model 
parameters (via equation (20); note that the initial capital endowment  is exogenously given; 
hence 
0K
K  can be calculated by using  and the equilibrium growth rate of capital , where  
is a function of exogenous model parameters as shown in Lemma 1). When we have , 
0K
*g *g
mm kl / Y
~
, 
K  and E  as functions of exogenous model parameters, we can derive ... ,, sermanagr ΛΛΛ  and 
 as functions of exogenous model parameters. Γ
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3.2.4 Consistency with stylized facts 
Lemma 3: The PBGP of our model satisfies the Kaldor facts regarding the 
development of the great ratios. That is, the aggregate capital intensity (K/L) is 
increasing; the aggregate capital-income-share (  or ), the 
aggregate labour-income-share (  or 
YrK / )/( HYrK −
YwL / )/( HYwL − ) and the aggregegate 
capital-to-output ratio (K/Y or K/(Y-H)) are constant (where r is the real rate of 
return on capital and w is the real wage rate). 
Proof: The constancy of K/Y and K/(Y-H) as well as the increasing capital-intensity 
(K/L) are directly implied by Lemma 1. Since we assume perfect polypolisitic 
markets, the marginal productivity of capital (labour) in a sub-sector i is equal to 
the real rate of return on capital (real wage rate) for all i. This implies for example 
for : mi =
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m
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Hence, Lemma 1 and equations (32) and (33) imply that 
Y
rK , 
HY
rK
− , Y
wL  and 
HY
wL
−  are constant. Q.E.D. 
 
Note that there are two further Kaldor-facts: “growth rate of real GDP is constant” 
and the “real rate of return on capital is constant”. As discussed in section 3.1, due 
to numéraire-choice we cannot say whether these two Kaldor-facts are satisfied 
approximately in our model. However, as mentioned before, the constancy of the 
real interest rate seems to be rather not a fact in reality. Furthermore, the results by 
Ngai and Pissarides (2004, 2007) imply that aggregate output expressed in 
manufacturing terms (as in our model) behaves in similar fashion as aggregate 
output measured in reality (by using some compound numéraire). Hence, our 
model could be consistent with a constant growth rate of aggregate output. 
 
Lemma 4: Along the PBGP the development of sectoral employment shares over 
time (equations (30)-(31)) can be monotonous (monotonously increasing, 
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monotonously decreasing or constant) or non-monotonous (“hump-shaped” or 
“U-shaped”), depending on the parameterization of the model.  
Proof: This Lemma is implied by equations (30)-(31). In the proof of Lemma 2 we 
have shown that , and .. , managr ΛΛ .serΛ  are constant along the PBGP, Y~  grows at 
rate  along the PBGP (see Lemma 1) and *g Γ  decreases at constant rate along the 
PBGP. Hence, since Y~/1  and Γ  grow at different rates, equation (30b) implies that 
the development of the manufacturing-employment-share over time ( ) can be 
non-monotonous, provided that  has not the same sign as . That is, it 
can be hump-shaped or U-shaped depending on the parameterization. Hence, the 
model can reproduce a “hump-shaped” development of the manufacturing-
employment share over time, which has been emphasized by Ngai and Pissarides 
(2007) and Maddison (1980). Note that only sectors, which use at least two 
technologies, can feature non-monotonous development of their employment share 
over time. However, as discussed in section 3.1 the manufacturing sector (i.e. the 
capital producing sector) need not using two technologies, i.e. the model could be 
set up such that the agricultural sector or the services sector uses two technologies. 
Hence, in fact any of the sectors could feature non-monotonous dynamics of its 
employment-share over time. The proof that  
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Lemma 5: Agriculture, manufacturing and services have different production 
functions in our model. Especially, the optimal capital-intensity differs across these 
sectors. 
Proof: Since we assumed that agriculture (services) uses only technology 1 (2) its 
production function is represented by technology 1 (2). Hence, we know that the 
technology (especially the TFP-growth-rate and the capital-intensity) differ across 
agriculture and services. Furthermore, manufacturing uses both technologies. 
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Hence, the average manufacturing technology is a mix of technology 1 and 2. 
Hence, the representative production function of the manufacturing sector is 
different in comparison to the services sector or the agricultural sector which each 
use only one technology. Nevertheless, since we have an emphasis on the cross-
capital-intensity structural change, let us have a close look on the capital-intensity 
(
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. ), the output-elasticity of labor ( .agrλ , .manλ  and .serλ ) 
and the output-elasticity of capital ( .agrκ , .manκ  and .serκ ) in each sector: 
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(Note that output-elasticity of factors is equal to the factor-income shares due to the 
assumption of perfect markets and perfect factor mobility in our model.) Overall, 
capital intensities and output-elasticities of inputs differ across sectors agriculture, 
manufacturing and services. Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 6: Along the PBGP the factor-reallocation across the agricultural, 
manufacturing and services sector is determined by cross-sector-TFP-growth-
disparity, by cross sector capital-intensity-disparity and by non-homothetic 
preferences. 
Proof: As discussed above, the TFP-growth rates and the capital-intensities differ 
across the sectors agriculture, manufacturing and services; see also Lemma 5. 
Equations (30)-(31) (and equations (21) and (28)) imply that cross-sector-
differences in TFP-growth-rates and cross-sector-differences in output-elasticities 
of inputs (which determine the capital-intensities) determine the strength of the 
factor reallocation between the sectors agriculture, manufacturing and services. 
Especially, they affect the sectoral employment shares ( ,  and ) via the 
terms 
.agrl .manl .serl
Y~  and Γ , which are among others functions of the parameters which 
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determine the sectoral TFP-growth rates and sectoral capital intensities (see 
equations (21), (31d) and (28) and Lemma 5).  
Furthermore, equations (8) to (11) imply that preferences are non-homothetic 
across sectors agriculture, manufacturing and services. A detailed proof is in 
APPENDIX D, where we show among others that the terms ∑ ,  
and  determine the pattern of non-homotheticity across sectors agriculture, 
manufacturing and services. Equations (30)-(31) imply that this non-homotheticity 
determines the strength and direction of structural change (via terms , 
 and ). Q.E.D. 
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Lemma 7: Intersectoral outsourcing (i.e. shifts in intermediates production across 
sectors) takes place along the PBGP. That is, along the PBGP manufacturing-
sector-producers shift more and more intermediates production to services-sector-
producers (i.e.  changes), provided that services-sector-production becomes 
cheaper and cheaper (or less and less expensive) in comparison to manufacturing-
sector-production (i.e. provided that relative prices change), and vice versa. Any 
direction of relative price changes (and hence any direction of intermediate-
production shifts between the manufacturing and the services sector) can be 
generated along the PBGP, depending on the parameterization. 
ji hh /
Proof: See APPENDIX E. 
 
Theorem 1: The PBGP satisfies simultaneously the following stylized facts: 
• Kaldor-facts regarding the development of the great ratios,  
• Kuznets facts regarding structural change patterns,  
• “stylized facts regarding cross-sector-heterogeneity in production-
technology” (see section 2 as well), and  
• empirical evidence on structural change determinants in industrialized 
countries (see section 2).  
Proof: The consistency of the PBGP with the Kaldor facts is implied by Lemma 3. 
 22
Note that empirical evidence on structural change between agriculture, 
manufacturing and services in industrial countries implies the following stylized 
facts for the development of the employment shares over the last century (see 
footnote 1): 
• the agricultural sector featured a monotonously decreasing employment share, 
• the services sector featured a monotonously increasing employment share, and 
• the manufacturing sector featured a constant or “hump-shaped” employment 
share (depending on the length of the period considered). 
In the proof of Lemma 4 we have shown that our model can reproduce these 
stylized facts regarding the development of the agricultural, manufacturing and 
services employment shares. Hence, the PBGP is consistent with the Kuznets-facts. 
The consistency of the PBGP with the “stylized facts regarding cross-sector-
heterogeneity in production-technology” is shown in Lemma 5, where we show 
that production technology differs across agriculture, manufacturing and services in 
our model. 
Finally the consistency of the PBGP with the empirical evidence on structural-
change-determinants in industrialized countries is shown in Lemmas 6 and 7. 
Q.E.D. 
 
3.2.5 The relationship between structural change and aggregate-
dynamics 
Now we turn to the question about the relationship between structural change and 
aggregate growth, i.e. we ask how structural change affects aggregate growth, 
which is important for understanding the Kuznets-Kaldor-puzzle. In the following 
we will show that there are two types of structural change, which are distinguished 
according to their impact on the aggregate structure of the economy. 
 
Definition 2: The term “cross-capital-intensity structural change” stands for 
factor reallocation across sectors which differ by capital intensity. 
It can be shown that 
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where .agrλ  ( .agrκ ), .manλ  ( .manκ ) and .serλ  ( .serκ ) are respectively the income-share 
of labor (capital) in sectors agriculture, manufacturing and services. Equation (37) 
follows from the assumption of factor mobility across sectors and from the 
assumption of perfect markets. 
Equation (37) and Lemma 1 imply that there are two sorts of cross-capital-intensity 
structural change: 
(1) Cross-capital-intensity structural change where l  is not constant. Lemma 1 
implies that the economy is on a PBGP, only if  is constant; furthermore, 
equation (37) implies that the constancy of 
mm kl /
l  is required for the constancy of 
. Hence, as long as mm kl / l  is not constant, the economy is not on a PBGP and the 
Kaldor-facts are not satisfied (exactly). That is, the type of structural change which 
is associated with a change in l  is not compatible with the Kaldor facts (unless 
structural change is very weak such that its impact via l  is weak, which would 
imply that Kaldor facts are approximately satisfied). 
(2) Cross-capital-intensity structural change which is compatible with a constant 
l . If this sort of structural change exists in our model, an economy can be on a 
PBGP, even when cross-capital-intensity factor reallocation takes place, provided 
that this factor reallocation is such that l = const. (see also Lemma 1). 
So we can postulate the following definition and theorem: 
 
Definition 3: “Neutral structural change” stands for cross-capital-intensity 
structural change which satisfies the following condition: 
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Theorem 2: The cross-capital-intensity structural change (between agriculture, 
manufacturing and services) along the PBGP is “neutral” in the sense of 
Definition 3. 
Proof: Note that we have shown in Lemma 5 that sectors agriculture, 
manufacturing and services differ by technology, and especially by capital intensity 
and by output-elasticities of inputs/income-shares of inputs. Lemma 2 implies that 
structural change takes place across these sectors. Equation (37), Definition 3 and 
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Lemma 1 (necessity of a constant  for a PBGP) imply the rest of the 
theorem. Q.E.D. 
mm kl /
 
Theorem 3: Neutral structural change is an explanation for the Kuznets-Kaldor-
Puzzle in our model.  
Proof: Remember that the Kuznets-Kaldor-puzzle was about the empirical 
question why (cross-capital-intensity) structural change is compatible with the 
stability of the great ratios (Kaldor facts). Theorem 2 implies that neutral-cross-
capital-intensity structural change takes place along the PBGP, while Theorem 1 
shows that the PBGP is consistent with the Kaldor facts. Thus, Kaldor-facts are 
satisfied, since cross-technology structural change needs not contradicting the 
Kaldor facts. In our model only “neutral structural change” (Definition 3) does not 
contradict Kaldor facts. Furthermore, Theorem 1 shows the generality of our proof: 
neutral cross-technology structural change is not only consistent with the Kaldor 
facts about the great ratios but also with the other stylized facts which are relevant 
for the analysis of the relationship between structural change and aggregates. 
Hence, Theorem 1 shows that we solved the Kuznets-Kaldor-puzzle under 
consideration of the most important structural change determinants and under 
assumption of sectoral cross-technology disparities observed in reality. Q.E.D. 
 
The convenient feature regarding latter two theorems is that we can use them to test 
our theory empirically: We can calculate l , and then decompose which share of 
structural change does not change the value of l  and which share of structural 
change changes the value of l . In this way we can evaluate the quantitative 
significance of our model-explanation for the Kuznets-Kaldor-Puzzle, since our 
explanation focuses only on structural change which does not change l  (due to 
Theorem 2).  
However, before doing so we show two further interesting results 
 
Proposition 3: The output-elasticity of inputs ( .manλ , .manκ ) is not constant in the 
manufacturing sector along the PBGP, but changes according to the amount of 
inputs used in this sector. 
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Proof: This is implied by equations (35) and (36). Note that any sector which uses 
two technologies has a non-constant output-elasticity of inputs in our model 
setting. Q.E.D. 
 
This result is interesting: in fact it implies that observed technology changes in 
sectors need not necessarily resulting form technological progress at sector level, 
but can also result from structural change. Of course this requires that sectors use 
several technologies, which seems to be a reasonable assumption. This fact could 
be of importance for further research, especially when analyzing endogenous 
technological progress at sector level. That is, Proposition 3 implies that such 
research will require considering technology change at sector level with caution, 
since some technology change may not result from technological progress at sector 
level but from structural change. 
As discussed in section 3.1, we assume that there are only two technologies in our 
model, but that there is an arbitrary number of subsectors. Hence, some subsectors 
have to use identical technologies. As explained there, we use this assumption to 
explain the concept of “uncorrelated preferences and technologies” in a traceable 
way, which will be of interest later in this paper. However, the assumption of partly 
identical production functions is not necessary for the key results of the actual 
section: the following proposition shows that the key result of this section (namely 
for the existence of neutral structural change) can be derived even if all (sub-
)sectors have completely different production functions. 
 
Proposition 4: Generalization of our results: In a framework where 
• all sub-sectors (i) have sub-sector-specific production functions,  
• sub-sectoral production functions are general neoclassical production 
functions with capital and labour as input-factors and labour-augmenting 
technological progress 
a necessary condition for neutrality of cross-capital-intensity structural change 
and for the satisfaction of Kaldor-facts is  
 
(39) .~ constll
i i
i =≡ ∑ λ  
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where iλ  is the output-elasticity of labour in subsector i which is equal to the 
labour-income share in sector i. 
Proof: See APPENDIX F. 
 
4. A measure of neutrality of cross-capital-intensity 
structural change 
In the previous section, we have presented a model which explains the Kuznets-
Kaldor-puzzle with a certain structural change pattern which we name “neutral 
structural change”. In Theorem 2 and Proposition 4 we have shown that this 
structural change pattern must satisfy condition (38). Due to lack of data we cannot 
consider intermediates production explicitly. Therefore, we assume that capital and 
labour are the only inputs in the production function in this section. In this case 
condition (38) transforms into condition (39).  
In Proposition 4 we have generalized the validity of condition (38) to a more 
general framework than that of section 3. Hence, the development of this condition 
is not only of interest for our model, but for all models which analyze PBGP’s.  
We can use condition (39) to asses to what extent neutral structural change takes 
place in reality. 
For the calculations in this section we use the data for the U.S.A., which is 
available at the web-site of the U.S. Department of Commerce (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis). We use the U.S.-Gross-Domestic-Product-(GDP)-by-
Industry-Data, which is based on the sector-definition from the “Standard 
Industrial Classification System” and which defines the following sectors: 
(1) Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 
(2) Mining 
(3) Construction 
(4) Manufacturing 
(5) Transportation and public utilities 
(6) Wholesale trade 
(7) Retail trade 
(8) Finance, insurance, and real estate 
(9) Services 
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Our calculations are based on the data for the period 1948-1987. Uniform data for 
longer time-periods is not available, since the “Standard Industrial Classification 
System” has been modified over time (hence, the sector definition after 1987 is not 
the same as the sector definition before 1987). 
To calculate the sectoral labour income shares ( iλ ) we divided “(Nominal) 
Compensation of Employees” by “(Nominal) Value Added by Industry” in each 
sector. The sectoral employment shares ( ) are calculated by using the sectoral 
data on “Full-time Equivalent Employees”. (This approach is similar to the one 
used by Acemogu and Guerrieri (2008)). 
il
Figure 1 depicts the development of l~ , calculated by these data: 
 
Figure 1: Development of l~  over time 
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We can see that  is decreasing and not constant. Thus, structural change has not 
been neutral (in the sense of Definition 3). The question is, how small the decline 
of  is. The decline in  could have been much stronger or much weaker. If the 
decline was relatively small, we could postulate that  is “approximately constant” 
from a theoretical point of view; hence, the model of neutral structural change 
would be relatively good in explaining the Kuznets-Kaldor puzzle. Hence, we have 
to develop an index which indicates how strong the decline is. In the following we 
l~
l~ l~
l~
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develop such an index. This index is based on calculating the strongest possible 
decline in  and then relating the actual decline to it. l~
Any actual l~  can be expressed as a unique combination of neutral and “maximally 
non-neutral structural change”. “Maximally non-neutral structural change” is the 
pattern of factor reallocation which causes the maximal decline in l~  for a given 
amount of reallocated labour over a period. Hence, maximally non-neutral 
structural change is a diametric concept of neutral structural change: while neutral 
structural change is defined upon no change in l~ , maximally non-neutral structural 
change is defined upon maximal change in l~ . This allows us to create an index 
which shows us whether a given amount of reallocated labour has been reallocated 
rather in the neutral way or rather in the non-neutral way. According to this 
discussion the following relation must be true: 
(40) max)~()~)(1()~( lIlIl N
neutral
N
actual Δ+Δ−=Δ  
where  is a weighting factor between neutral and maximally non-neutral 
structural change, i.e. it indicates whether structural change was rather neutral or 
rather non-neutral; if  =1, structural change is maximally non-neutral over the 
observation period; if =0 structural change is neutral over the observation 
period. 
NI
NI
NI
actuall )~(Δ  measures the change in l~  which really took place between 1948 
and 1987; max)~( lΔ  measures the maximal change in l~  which is (hypothetically) 
possible with the given amount of cross-sector factor reallocation between 1948 
and 1987, i.e.  stands for “maximally non-neutral structural change”. max)~( lΔ
neutrall )~(Δ  measures the change in l~  which is caused by neutral structural change. 
Since per definition neutrall )~(Δ  is equal to zero, we can rearrange the condition from 
above as follows: 
(41) 
max)~(
)~(
l
lI
actual
N Δ
Δ≡  
where max)~( lΔ  and actuall )~(Δ  are defined as follows: 
(42) ∑∑ −=−≡Δ
i i
i
i i
iactual lllll 1948
1948
1987
1987
19481987
~~)~( λλ  
(43) ∑∑ −=−≡Δ
i i
i
i i
i lllll 1948
1948
1987
max1987
1948
max
1987
max ~~)~( λλ  
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 where , ,  and  denote respectively the employment share of 
sector i in 1948, the employment share of sector i in 1987, the labour-share of 
income in sector i in 1948 and the labour-share of income in sector i in1987. 
 stands for the hypothetical employment share of sector i which would 
result if the labour which has been reallocated between 1948 and 1987 were 
reallocated in such a manner that the maximal decrease in 
1948
il
1987
il
1948
iλ 1987iλ
max1987
il
l~  is accomplished 
between 1948 and 1987. That is, the ’s stand for the hypothetical factor 
allocation in 1987 which yields the maximally non-neutral structural change 
between 1948 and 1987. 
max1987
il
Last but not least, since our definition of  requires knowing how much 
labour has been reallocated between 1948 and 1987, we propose the following 
index of observable factor reallocation between 1948 and 1987: 
max1987
il
∑ −≡Δ
i
ii lll
19481987
2
1  
This measure indicates how much labour has been reallocated between 1948 and 
1987. This measure is set up as follows: First, the change in the employment share 
in each sector is measured. The absolute values (modulus) of these changes are 
summed up (otherwise, without taking absolute values, the sum of the sectoral 
changes would always be equal to zero, since ∑ =
i
il 1  per definition). Since the 
change in the employment share in one sector has always a corresponding change 
in the employment shares of the other sectors (labour is reallocated across sectors), 
the sum of the absolute values of the changes must be divided by two to avoid 
double-counting.  
It is possible that between 1948 and 1987 in some sectors the employment share 
increased first and decreased then. Hence, the pure difference  would 
indicate less reallocation than actually took place. Our index of factor reallocation 
( ) neglects such non-monotonousity in sectoral employment shares. Hence, it 
underestimates the real amount of labour reallocated between 1948 and 1987. 
Therefore, our index  underestimates the neutrality of structural change: if more 
labour was reallocated during the period, the hypothetical maximal change in 
19481987
ii ll −
lΔ
NI
l~  
( ) would be larger; hence,  would be smaller, which would imply more max)~( lΔ NI
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neutrality. Overall, for these reasons, our index  indicates less neutrality than 
actually is. 
NI
Note that it is important that our measure of maximally non-neutral structural 
change ( ) is based on the actual amount of reallocated labour ( ). In this 
way we distinguish between strength and direction of structural change. Strength 
of structural change implies how much labour has been reallocated (e.g. as 
measured by ). The direction of structural change implies how the labour has 
been reallocated across technology. Neutrality of structural change is not related to 
strength but only to direction, since condition (39) can be satisfied by more or less 
strong structural change patterns. What counts for satisfying condition (39) is the 
direction of structural change. If there is no significant direction of structural 
change, (39) is satisfied. Therefore, when calculating the neutrality index it is 
important to be cautious about not defining 
max)~( lΔ lΔ
lΔ
max)~( lΔ  such that it features stronger 
structural change than actual structural change is. Therefore, we calculate max)~( lΔ  
by using the actual amount of reallocated labor ( lΔ ). 
 
The data that we need for our calculations is given in the following table: 
 
Table 1 
 
Sector 1948/1 iλ  1987/1 iλ  1948il  1987il  
(8) 5.248981966 3.997781119 0.039609477 0.077711379 
(1) 6.874359747 3.921756596 0.05019623 0.019310549 
(2) 2.62541713 3.240100098 0.024056398 0.008630482 
(5) 1.632072868 2.20691581 0.099835263 0.063265508 
(6) 1.937362752 1.72651328 0.062648384 0.070192118 
(7) 1.988458748 1.649066345 0.141770435 0.191092947 
(3) 1.495168451 1.505702087 0.056228499 0.059919498 
(4) 1.505805486 1.447391372 0.376011435 0.229516495 
(9) 1.681140684 1.444831355 0.149643878 0.280361023 
Now, by using these data, we have to do the following steps to calculate : NI
1.) Calculate the amount of reallocated labour between 1948 and (1987). This 
calculation yields:  0.23. ≈Δl
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2.) Calculate max1987
~l . Note that there are always two ways of factor reallocation: the 
one which increases l~  over time and the one which decreases l~  over time. Figure 
1 shows that factor reallocations over the observation period were decreasing l~ . 
Thus, for calculating max1987
~l  we have to find the (hypothetical) factor allocation in 
1987 which yields the strongest (hypothetical) decrease in l~  over the observation 
period and, thus, the lowest max1987
~l . According to our definition of max1987
~l , we have to 
do the following steps:  
a.) Find the sector which has the smallest . This is actually sector (9). 1987/1 iλ
b) Make a ranking of the remaining sectors according to their . This ranking 
is given by (8)-(1)-(2)-(5)-(6)-(7)-(3)-(4), where sector (8) has the largest  
and sector (4) has the smallest  in this ranking. 
1987/1 iλ
1987/1 iλ
1987/1 iλ
c) By using the ranking from b) reallocate the labour from the sectors which have 
the largest  to sector (9). We first we use the whole amount of labour which 
has been employed in sector (8) in 1948, then the whole amount of labour which 
has been employed in sector (1) in 1948, and so on, stepping up in the ranking until 
we have hypothetically reallocated the whole 
1987/1 iλ
≈Δl 0.23. Hence, we obtain the 
following maximally non-neutral factor allocation for the year 1987 
 
Table 2 
Sector max1987
il  
(8) = 0 
(1) = 0 
(2) = 0 
(5) = 0 
(6) = = 0.046969461 )( 1948)8(
1948
)5(
1948
)2(
1948
)1(
1948
)6( llllll −−−−Δ−
(7) = = 0.141770435 1948)7(l
(3) = = 0.056228499 1948)3(l
(4) = = 0.376011435 1948)4(l
(9) = = 0.37902017 ll Δ+1948)9(
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3.) The rest of the calculations is quite simple: by inserting the data from Tables 1 
and 2 into equations (41)-(43), we can obtain . NI
 
Our calculations imply an index  = 0.45. This implies that actual structural 
change was slightly closer to its neutral extreme than to its non-neutral extreme. In 
other words, the actual structural change between 1948 and 1987 was by 55% 
neutral and by 45% maximally non-neutral.  
NI
In this sense, our model can explain 55% of the structural change between 1948 
and 1987.  
Note that our measure underestimates the neutrality of structural change. That is, in 
reality more than 55% of structural change can be regarded as neutral. There are 
two reasons: as discussed above, our measure assumes monotonousity of factor 
reallocation; furthermore, as will be discussed close to the end of next section, the 
period, which we used for analysis, is quite short and structural change is more 
neutral over very long periods of time. 
 
5. On correlation between preferences and 
technologies 
In section 3.1 we have assumed that preferences and technologies are uncorrelated. 
In detail, we have assumed that  
• on average the income elasticity of demand is equal when comparing 
technology-1-goods and technology-2-goods 
• on average the elasticity of substitution is equal to unity when comparing 
technology-1-goods and technology-2-goods. 
In the following we will discuss the rationale for these assumptions. We focus here 
on the elasticity of substitution, but the corresponding arguments apply for the 
income-elasticity of demand. 
Assuming that the elasticity of substitution between two goods is different from 
unity implies that the household has a certain preference for the one good over the 
other: Imagine that there are only two goods (good A and good B). If the relative 
price of the good A increases by one percent and the relative demand for this good 
decreases by less than one percent, good A is regarded as more important than 
 33
good B by the household in the dynamic context. That is, the price change causes a 
weaker reaction than it would be if the two goods were regarded as equivalents. 
Only if two goods are regarded as equivalents, a one-percent-change in the relative 
price between these goods would yield a (minus) one-percent-change in the 
demand-relation between these goods (hence, elasticity of substitution between 
these goods being equal to one). 
Now, the same argument could be applied to two groups of goods (group A and 
group B): if the household regards the two groups as equivalents, the average 
elasticity of substitution between the two groups is equal to unity. Otherwise, we 
would have to postulate that on average group A includes goods that are preferred 
over group B (or the other way around). 
Now, imagine that the whole range of products in an economy is divided into two 
groups according to their production technology. Group A includes goods that are 
regarded as technologically progressive and group B includes goods that are 
produced by a backward technology. Furthermore, let us make the following 
assumptions: 
(a) The household doesn’t know anything about the production process, i.e. the 
household’s preference depends only on the “objective taste” of the goods (but not 
on the knowledge that the good is produced at e.g. high-capital-intensity). 
“Objective taste” means the taste which depends only on the physical/chemical 
properties of the good or on the basic properties (i.e. actual quality) of the service, 
but not on the knowledge about the production process of the good or service. For 
example, if two goods are produced by different capital intensities, but if the two 
goods are basically the same (i.e. have the same physical and chemical properties), 
the objective taste of the two goods is the same. A further example is the following 
experiment: imagine that a live concert is recorded and then later replayed as a 
playback to a similar audience (while the original musicians pretend performing 
music). The labour-intensity of the original concert is higher in comparison to the 
playback concert, since pretending is easier (i.e. less labour-intense) in comparison 
to performing live music. The objective taste of the two concerts would be the 
same. (However, the “subjective taste” of the two concerts would differ, if the 
audience knew that the second concert is only a playback.) 
(b) The “objective taste” of a good is on average not dependent on the technology 
which is used to produce it. That is, some very tasty goods are produced by 
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progressive technology and some very tasty goods are produced by backward 
technology; as well, some less tasty goods are produced by progressive technology 
and some less tasty goods are produced by backward technology. 
With these assumptions we would conclude that on average group-A-goods are not 
preferred over group-B-goods and group-B-goods are not preferred over group-A-
goods. That is, the groups are regarded as equivalents; hence, on average the 
elasticity of substitution between these two groups will be close to one (according 
to the discussion above).  
Now let us make a further assumption: 
(c) We look only on the averages over very long periods of time and we assume 
that there are many technologies and goods. 
Hence, from this perspective due to the law of large numbers the elasticity of 
substitution between the two groups is equal to unity. 
In other words, if preferences and technologies are uncorrelated (i.e. if the taste 
does not depend on production technology), the household-behaviour will not 
display any preference for technology-level (group A or group B), provided that 
very long periods of time are considered and provided that there are many goods. 
This is what we assumed in section 3.1: we assumed that there are two 
technologies and that there are many goods which are produced with these 
technologies and that the preference structure does not display any preference for a 
certain technology. This is what we did by assumptions (10) and (11). These 
assumptions ensure that on average the elasticity of substitution between 
technology-1-goods and technology-2-goods is equal to unity. 
Now the question is whether the assumptions (a), (b) and (c) are suitable in long 
run growth models. 
Assumption (c) seems not to be problematic, since long-run growth theory is 
anyway based on analyzing long-run-averages (e.g. the time preference rate is 
assumed to be constant in standard neoclassical growth models). Furthermore, 
since we look at very long run, any accidental correlations between technology and 
preferences, which may arise from a relatively low number of products, may as 
well offset each other over the period’s average. 
Assumption (b) is less problematic in comparison to assumption (a). In fact, 
technological progress during the last century has implicitly shown that the basic 
physical/chemical properties of a good are not necessarily dependent on its capital-
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intensity. In industrialized countries nearly all goods featured some technological 
progress which substituted labour by capital, while the basic physical properties of 
the goods remained the same basically. The most obvious example is agriculture. 
Food has for the most part the same basic physical properties today as earlier in the 
century, while the capital-intensity of agriculture increased significantly. Such 
developments are also apparent in manufacturing (e.g. regarding the increasing 
capital-intensity of car-production) and services (e.g. cash-teller-machines). 
Furthermore, today we can imagine for nearly every good or service a relatively 
realistic technology which could substitute the labour by capital, without changing 
the basic physical properties of the good. It is not plausible to assume that in the 
very long run technological progress is restricted to certain types of goods. In the 
last two decades many service-jobs which were regarded as labour-intensive were 
replaced by computer-machines and the substitutability of human by machines in 
services is increasing. Hence, when developing a long run theory of structural 
change, the dependency between technology and certain types of goods (and hence 
certain preferences) seems to be difficult to defend. Therefore, overall, the 
assumption that the “objective taste” of a good is independent of the capital-
intensity of the production process seems to be acceptable to some degree, 
especially when assuming (c). 
It is more difficult to evaluate assumption (a) a priori. Assumption (a) requires that 
the representative household behaves like he doesn’t know about the actual capital 
intensity of a good, i.e. it is required that the household’s demand reaction to a 
price and/or income change is based only on physical/chemical properties of a 
good. What we know from basic microeconomics (e.g. form the discussion about 
“Giffen-goods”) is that the price elasticity (and income elasticity) depends on the 
basic physical/chemical properties of the good, i.e. whether the physical/chemical 
properties of a good are such that it is feasible to satisfy the basic needs of a 
household. (The price elasticity for such goods is low.) On the other hand, there is 
also a discussion about a “snob” effect, where some very labour-intensity services 
(like a full time servant) are used to signal the wealth of the household. Such 
services have a relatively high income-elasticity and price-elasticity. However, as 
well there are many high-capital-intensity-goods which have high price-elasticity 
of demand and high income-elasticity of demand, like very expensive cars. Hence, 
there is both: capital-intensive and labour-intensive goods which feature a 
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relatively high price-elasticity and a relative high income-elasticity. Our model 
requires that on average (i.e. when looking at the average of all consumption 
goods) the income (price) elasticity of demand does not depend on the capital-
intensity of a good.  
Last not least, the increasing complexity of the products and of the production 
process, international outsourcing and increasing variety of products make it 
increasingly unlikely that the household has clear information about the capital-
intensity of a large part of its consumption bundle. 
All in all, the empirical evidence from the previous section implies that the 
assumption of no/low correlation between technology and preferences can explain 
a part of the Kuznets-Kaldor-puzzle. The fact that there is some correlation 
between technology and preferences results probably from the fact that assumption 
(a) has not been satisfied over the time-period of our sample. That is, probably high 
labour-intensity of a service has been regarded as an aspect of quality and/or 
luxury. Hence, high-labour-intensity services have probably had high income-
elasticity of demand on average, which caused the correlation between technology 
and preferences in the past. 
The fact that there has been some correlation between preferences and technologies 
in our sample does not necessarily imply that we can presume such correlation in 
future: 
We analyzed only a 40 year period. This is a very short period to satisfy 
assumption (c) and to study growth theory empirically in general. Remember that 
Kaldor-facts (which we seek to explain in our paper) do not necessarily apply to 
such a short period. The probability is very high that over such a short period 
“accidental” correlation between technology and preferences arises, which does not 
persist over the long run. It seems that this was the case: The technological 
innovation between 1940 and 1980 allowed to a big part an increase in capital-
intensity in non-service-sectors (such as manufacturing and agriculture). That is, 
the technological break-throughs were such that they were easy to implement in 
non-services sectors but they were hardly implementable in the services sector8. 
Hence, if services have high income-elasticity of demand, some correlation 
                                                 
8 Of course, the term “services” means here rather personal services (i.e. services which require 
face-to-face contact, e.g. counselling) and rather not such services as transportation. The latter 
featured strong increases in capital-intensity. See for example Baumol et al. (1985) on discussion 
and empirical evidence about progressive and stagnant services. 
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between technology and preferences may have been arisen due to such biased 
technological progress. However, new sorts of technological break-through 
occurred after this period, especially in the information and communication 
technology. Such break-throughs have increased the capital-intensity in the 
services sector and have a high potential for increasing the capital-intensity of the 
services sector drastically (e.g. by progress in computers and robotics, which is 
implementable in services).  
Hence, our empirical results probably over-estimate the long-run degree of 
correlation between preferences and technologies; the long-run correlation between 
preferences and technologies is probably very low or even inexistent. In this sense, 
our model of independent preferences and technologies predicts quite well the 
future structural change impacts on aggregates. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this essay we have searched for a solution of the Kuznets-Kaldor-puzzle. In fact, 
the Kuznets-Kaldor-puzzle states that aggregate ratios behaved in a quite stable 
manner in industrialized countries, while at the same time massive factor 
reallocation took place across sectors which differ by technology (and especially 
by optimal capital-intensity). 
 
Summary of our results 
For the first time in the literature, we have shown that a PBGP can exist even when 
factors are reallocated across sectors which differ by capital intensity. We name the 
cross-capital-intensity structural change which is compatible with a PBGP “neutral 
structural change”.  
To test the actual neutrality of structural change we developed an index of 
neutrality. In fact, our measure of neutrality indicates the weighting between two 
measures ( )neutrall~Δ  and ( )max~lΔ . ( )neutrall~Δ  measures the hypothetical change in l~  
which would result if the empirically observed amount of reallocated labour ( ) 
was reallocated in the neutral way. 
lΔ
( )max~lΔ measures the hypothetical change in l~  
which would result if  was reallocated in the maximally non-neutral way. 
Hence, the weighting between these two measures implies how much labour has 
lΔ
 38
been reallocated in the neutral way and how much labour has been reallocated in 
the non-neutral way between 1948 and 1987. This index implies that 55% of 
structural change can be regarded as neutral. We provided also some 
theoretical/verbal arguments which imply that over the (very) long run significantly 
more than 55% of structural change is neutral (see section 5). 
We also made a first step towards a micro-foundation of neutrality of structural 
change by showing that neutral structural change can arise if preferences and 
technologies are uncorrelated. Therefore, our neutrality index could also be 
interpreted as an index of correlation between technology and preferences. In this 
sense, our empirical findings imply that the correlation between preferences and 
technologies is rather low. Exactly speaking, the actual correlation was closer to 
the extreme of “no correlation” than to the extreme of “maximal correlation”. 
 
Discussion 
Our empirical findings are valid for all the literature which analyses structural 
change along PBGP’s (and where capital is included into analysis): We have 
shown in Proposition 4 that every PBGP which satisfies the Kaldor-facts (exactly) 
must feature neutral structural change. Hence, we can say that the papers by 
Kongsamut et al. (2001), Ngai and Pissarides (2007) and Foellmi and Zweimueller 
(2008) are compatible with 55% of structural change observed over the period 
1948-1987. 
The latter papers – especially the one by Kongsamut et al. (2001) – have been 
criticized by Buera and Kaboski (2009) for not being able to reproduce some 
structural change dynamics. This criticism is primarily based on the Stone-Geary 
type preference structure which is used in this model. Note that, although our 
empirical results seem to be in line with Buera and Kaboski’s (2009)-results at first 
look, they are rather not comparable, since we analyse something completely 
different. Our empirical study is a test of the empirical validity of the partially 
balanced growth concept and of the independency assumption regarding 
preferences and technologies. For example, in contrast to Buera and Kaboski 
(2009), we do not assume any preference structure in our empirical test. Our results 
imply that, although independency between preferences and technologies has a 
large explanatory value regarding the Kuznets-Kaldor-puzzle (55% of factor-
reallocations “offset” each other), the partially balanced growth concept is not very 
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useful for predicting “shorter run” structural change – over periods of 40(!) years 
or so –, since it covers “only” 55% of structural change over such “short run” 
periods. Thus, to some extent our results imply that the new ways of structural 
change modelling which are suggested by Buera and Kaboski (2009) will not be 
good predictors of structural change over “shorter run”, if they are implemented 
into partially balanced growth frameworks. 
Overall, our explanation for the Kuznets-Kaldor-puzzle is the following: There is a 
certain degree of independency between technologies and preferences. As 
discussed in the previous section, over the very long run such independency comes 
from the assumption that the household’s consumption decisions are based on the 
physical and chemical properties of the goods, but not on the capital-intensity (i.e. 
households are not interested in the production process of the consumption goods 
but only on the “taste” of the goods). If preferences and technologies are 
uncorrelated (or independent), structural change patterns which satisfy all the 
empirical observations associated with the Kuznets-Kaldor-puzzle can arise 
(especially factors are reallocated across sectors which differ by capital intensity). 
We show that this explanation is compatible with 55% of structural change.  
The remaining task is to find a theoretical explanation for the fact that the 
remaining 45% of structural change must be compatible with the Kaldor facts as 
well (if we take the Kuznets-Kaldor-facts seriously). We suggest three 
explanations: 
Our preferred explanation of this fact is the following: We suggest that over the 
longer run (100 years or so) those 45% vanish, i.e. preferences and technologies are 
completely independent. In this sense, the 45% of structural change which seem to 
represent dependency between preferences and technologies result from “short 
run” effects, e.g. unbalanced capital accumulation (which shifts production factors 
to the manufacturing sector); remember that over shorter run (40 years) Kaldor-
facts are not satisfied anyway. Currently, we are working on a method to eliminate 
the effects of unbalanced capital expansion (and of the resulting shift towards 
manufacturing) in our empirical study. 
Another interesting explanation may be that these 45% are quantitatively small; 
hence, their aggregate impact is relatively low (in comparison to the other 
aggregate-growth determinants, e.g. technological progress) at least at the level of 
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stylized facts. In fact, this is implied by the paper by Acemogly and Guerrieri 
(2008).  
The third explanation: The aggregate effect of these 45% of structural change may 
be offset by the aggregate effects of other growth determinants, e.g. some sort of 
“economy-wide technological progress” may have accelerated between 1948 and 
1987 which would have offset the (negative) impacts of non-neutral structural 
change. Further research could analyze this question in more detail.  
Furthermore, it seems interesting to search for other micro-foundations of neutral 
structural change: we explained the parameter restrictions which are necessary for 
the existence of neutral structural change by uncorrelated preferences and 
technologies; however, there are certainly other micro-foundations which can 
explain these parameter restrictions. 
Our model features exogenous technology. Especially, the fact that technologies 
differ across sectors (“technology-bias”) is exogenous in our model. Such 
assumptions are often criticized today. In a separate paper (Stijepic and Wagner 
2011) we present an extension of our model where the technology-bias is 
endogenous. This extension has interesting results, e.g. it implies that technology-
bias does not vanish. However, this extension does not change any of the key 
results which we have summarized in this section. 
Note that we could try to assess the degree of correlation between preferences and 
technologies in an alternative way: First we would have to estimate the price 
elasticity of demand, the income elasticity of demand and the production functions 
for all sectors and then we would have to try to somehow figure out the degree of 
correlation between the estimated preference and technology parameters. This 
approach would be problematic for two reasons: 
(1) Estimation of preference parameters (and especially of income elasticity of 
demand) is very difficult, since there are problems in measuring the changes in 
quality of goods and services. Hence, it is difficult to isolate whether demand for a 
good increased due to relatively high income-elasticity of demand or due to an 
increase in quality of the service; see e.g. Ngai and Pissarides (2007). 
(2) Even if we could measure the preference and technology parameters exactly 
there would be a problem in defining a measure of correlation between preferences 
and technologies, since we have actually two sorts of preference parameters 
(income elasticity of demand and price elasticity of demand). Hence, if we have 
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two economies (A and B), which are identical except for their correlation between 
income elasticity and technology and between price elasticity and technology, it 
would be difficult to say in which economy the correlation between preferences 
and technologies is lower: For example, if the correlation between income elasticity 
and technology is slightly lower in country A in comparison to country B and if the 
correlation between price elasticity and technology is slightly lower in country B in 
comparison to country A, we could not say whether preferences and technologies 
are more or less correlated in country A in comparison to country B. Our approach 
omits this problem by focusing on the factor reallocation across technology which, 
as modelled in our paper, reflects the degree of correlation between preferences 
and technologies. 
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APPENDIX A 
There are two approaches to solve our model, which are known from the literature 
on the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model: (1) We can assume that there is a social 
planer who maximizes the welfare of the representative household (“benevolent 
dictator”); or (2) we can assume that there are many marginalistic households and 
entrepreneurs who maximize their life-time utility and profits in perfect markets. 
Both ways of solution lead to the same first order optimality conditions. We 
explain approach (1) in short and focus on the approach (2). 
 
APPROACH (1): 
Necessary (first order) conditions for an optimum 
The benevolent dictator maximizes the utility function of the representative 
household (equations (8)-(11)) subject to the equations (1)-(7) and (12)-(16). 
The Hamiltonian for this control problem is given by: 
( ) )(,..., 21 mmmHn hCKYCCCuHAM −−−+= δψ  
where Hψ  is the co-state variable.  
The variables of this Hamiltonian are determined as follows: 
iC  are given by mihYC iii ≠∀−=   ,  (cf. (5)), 
iY  are given by (1) and (2), 
Z  is given by (7) 
mk  is given by (cf. (3)), ∑
≠
−=
mi
im kk 1
ml  is given by (cf. (3)), ∑
≠
−=
mi
im ll 1
mz  is given by  (cf. (3)) ∑
≠
−=
mi
im zz 1
 
Control variables are:  
m
n
nmm
nmm
nmm
C
hh
zzzzz
kkkkk
lllll
,,...
,,...,,...,
,,...,,...,
,,...,,...,
1
1121
1121
1121
+−
+−
+−
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K  is state variable. 
The first order optimality condition can be derived by  
• setting the first derivatives of the Hamiltonian with respect to the control 
variables equal to zero 
• setting the first derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to the state 
variable equal to HH ψρψ &− . 
Then after some algebra, the first order optimality conditions (17)-(19) can be 
obtained. Q.E.D. We omit this derivation, since it is trivial. 
 
Proof that sufficient (second order) conditions are satisfied 
Note that the proof that the first order conditions are sufficient for an optimum is 
quite difficult in this APPROACH (1). Especially the proof of concavity in Step 1 
becomes quite “impossible” as we will see. Therefore, the following proof of 
sufficiency of the optimality conditions may be regarded as incomplete. As we 
will see, in APPROACH (2) this problem does not arise. 
To prove the sufficiency of these necessary conditions we use the Arrow-Kurz-
criterion, which can be applied in three steps. Note that in the following we omitted 
intermediates production, i.e. 0== μγ , for simplicity. (Analogous results can be 
obtained with intermediate production.) 
 
Step 1: Maximize the Hamiltonian with respect to the control variables for 
given state variable, co-state variable and time. 
In fact, this implies 0
!=∂
∂
mC
HAM  and (17). The latter together with (1), (2), (3) and 
(12) implies (21), (24) and (25). 
From (9) and (17) we obtain 
(A.1) i
p
CC i
i
mm
m
i
i ∀+−= θθω
ω  
Inserting this equation into (12) yields 
(A.2) 
m
mmCE ω
θ−=  
Inserting (A.1) and (A.2) into (9) yields after some algebra: 
(A.3) ωω +−= nn pEu lnln(.)  
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where ∑
+=
≡
n
mi
in
1
ωω  and ∑≡
i
ii )ln(ωωω  
and where we have obtained from (1), (2) and (17) 
(A.4) 
νβ
αχ
νχ
ν
β
χ
α −− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡
m
m
n Ll
KkABp /1  
Equations (9) and (A.2) and condition 0
!=∂
∂
mC
HAM  imply 
(A.5) 
EH
1=ψ  
Now, note that we have just derived the first order conditions for a maximum. 
These conditions are sufficient only if the Hamiltonian is jointly concave in the 
control variables for given state variable, co-state variable and time. This requires 
determining the signs of the first minors of the Hessian determinant of the 
Hamiltonian (with respect to the control variables for given state variable, co-state 
variable and time); see e.g. Chiang 1984, p.336. Since we have an arbitrary (and 
large) number of state variables this becomes impossible (at least for us), due to the 
difficulties in calculating determinants. (Note that sometimes these difficulties do 
not arise if the Hessian is a diagonal matrix. However, in our model it is not.) 
Therefore, Step 1 may be regarded as incomplete. We have not researched for a 
solution of this problem, since, as mentioned above, the model can be solved by 
using APPROACH (2). The proofs of sufficiency in APPROACH (2) are feasible 
for us. 
 
Step 2: Insert the optimality conditions from Step 1 into the Hamiltonian, in 
order to obtain ! ),,(~~ timeKMAHMAH Hψ=
Inserting (A.3) and (A.5) into the Hamiltonian yields: 
(A.6) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−++−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= KYptKMAH
H
Hnn
H
H δψψωωψψ
1ln1ln),,(~  
where  can be derived as (implicit) function of np Hψ  by using equations (A.4), 
(24), (21) and (A.5) (remember that in equation (24) H=0, due to (23) and 
0== μγ ) and  
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where Y can be derived as (implicit) function of Hψ  by using equations (25), (21), 
(24) and (A.5) (again, remember that in equation (24) H=0, due to (23) and 
0== μγ ). 
 
Step 3: Show that ),,(~~ tKMAHMAH Hψ=  is concave in K for given Hψ  and 
time, by showing that 0
)(
),,(~
2
2
<∂
∂
K
tKMAH Hψ . 
This step is quite lengthy and includes calculating implicit derivatives, but straight 
forward. After some algebra it can be shown that  
(A.7) 0)1(
1
)(
)(
),,(~
2
2
2
2
<+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +
−−=∂
∂ β
αβ
αχωψ
m
m
m
m
nH
l
k
l
kK
K
tKMAH  
This relation is true, since equation (24) implies that 0)(1 <>−
m
m
l
k
 if 0)(<>−αχ  
(remember that in equation (24) H=0, due to (23) and 0== μγ ). 
 
Since we have accomplished all three steps, the Arrow-Kurz-criterion implies 
that conditions (17)-(19) are sufficient for an optimum (together with the 
transversality condition). Q.E.D. (Remember, however, that there are some 
difficulties in Step 1, as explained there.) 
 
APPROACH (2) 
As mentioned above in this section we assume that there exist many marginalistic 
and identical households and producers. (Of course the producers are identical 
within a sector, while they differ across sectors.) The assumption of marginalistic 
agents implies that all agents consider the prices and factor prices as exogenous; 
i.e. all agents are “price-takers”. The prices, factor prices and quantities are 
determined by laws of (aggregate) demand and (aggregate) supply on the 
corresponding markets (where market clearing is assumed). 
This interpretation of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model is suggested by Cass 
(1965) and it is well known in the literature (see any book on growth economics, 
e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), pp.86ff). 
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Remember, however, that although APPROACH (1) and APPROACH (2) interpret 
our model in different ways, both approaches yield the same first order optimality 
conditions (and results in general). 
For simplicity we omit intermediates production in this section, i.e. we set 
0== μγ . (Analogous results can be obtained with intermediate production.) 
 
Producers 
Since we have assumed that each sector is polypolistic and since there is perfect 
mobility of factors across sectors, we know that the value of marginal factor-
productivity in each sector must be equal to the (economy-wide) factor-price, i.e. 
(A.8) iw
Ll
Yp
i
i
i ∀=∂
∂ ,
)(
 
(A.9) ir
Kk
Yp
i
i
i ∀=∂
∂ ,
)(
 
where  is the real wage rate and w r  is the real rate of return on capital; see also, 
e.g., Kongsamut et al. (2001). These conditions can be obtained by maximizing the 
sector-profit function { }KrkLwlYp iiii −−  with respect to factor inputs  and 
, while sector demand, sector-price and factor-prices are exogenous. (That is, 
the sector behaves like a price-taker; the reason for this fact is that all entrepreneurs 
of the sector are price-takers. This fact could be proved by modelling explicitly 
each sector as consisting of identical marginalistic profit-maximizing producers; 
then conditions (A.8) and (A.9) could be obtained by calculating the first-order 
conditions for profit-maximization of each individual producer and by aggregating 
over all producers of a sector.) 
Lli
Kki
We know that the wage rate and the rental rate of capital are equal across sectors 
due to the following fact: differences in factor-prices across sectors are eliminated 
instantly by cross-sector factor-migration due to the assumption of perfect cross-
sector factor-mobility. 
Equations (A.8) and (A.9) imply ji
Ll
Y
p
Ll
Yp
j
j
j
i
i
i ,,)()(
∀∂
∂=∂
∂  and 
ji
Kk
Y
p
Kk
Yp
j
j
j
i
i
i ,,)()(
∀∂
∂=∂
∂ . This in turn implies for mj =  due to (13): 
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(A.10) i
KkY
KkY
LlY
LlYp
ii
mm
ii
mm
i ∀∂∂
∂∂=∂∂
∂∂= ,
)(/
)(/
)(/
)(/  
which is part of optimality condition (17) (Q.E.D.). 
Inserting (1) and (2) into (A.10) yields 
(A.11)  mipi ,...1,1 ==
(A.12) nmip
Ll
KkABp n
m
m
i ,...1,
/1 +=≡⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
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⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
−
−
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αχ
νχ
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β
χ
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Households 
In this section the index ι  denotes the corresponding variable of the individual 
household. For example, while E  stands for consumption expenditures of the 
whole economy, ιE  stands for consumption expenditures of the household ι . We 
assume that there is an arbitrary and large number of households ( x,...1=ι ), 
sufficiently large to constitute marginalistic behaviour of households. Hence, it 
follows from equations (8)-(11) that each household has the following utility 
(A.13) ,     ιριιι ∀= ∫∞ − ,),...(
0
1 dteCCuU
t
n 0>ρ  
where 
(A.14) ι  θ ωιιιι ∀⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −= ∏
=
,)(ln),...(
1
1
n
i
iin
iCCCu
(A.15)  ∑
=
=
m
i
i
1
0ιθ
(A.16)  ∑
+=
=
n
mi
i
1
0ιθ
Furthermore, each household has the following dynamic constraint: 
(A.17) ιδ ιιι ∀−−+= ,)( EWrLwW&  
where ιW  is the wealth/assets of household ι , ιE  are consumption expenditures of 
household ι  and L  is the (exogenous) labour-supply of household ι . The latter 
implies that each household supplies the same amount of labour at the market.  
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The dynamic constraint (A.17) is standard (compare for example Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004), p.88). It implies that the wealth of the household increases by 
labour-income and by (net-) interest-rate-payments and decreases by consumption 
expenditures. 
Note that we assume that the labour supply of each household is exogenously 
determined. 
In line with (12), consumption expenditures of a household are given by 
(A.18) ι  ιι ∀= ∑ ,
i
iiCpE
Each household maximizes its life-time-utility (A.13)-(A.16) subject to its dynamic 
constraint (A.17). Since this optimization problem is time-separable (due to the 
assumption of separable time-preference and marginalistic household), it can be 
divided into two steps; see also, e.g., Foellmi and Zweimüller (2008), p.1320f:  
1.) Intratemporal (static) optimization: For a given level of consumption-budget 
( ιE ), the household optimizes the allocation of consumption-budget across goods.  
2.) Intertemporal (dynamic) optimization: The household determines the optimal 
allocation of consumption-budget across time. 
 
Intratemporal optimization: 
The household maximizes its instantaneous utility (A.14)-(A.16) subject to the 
constraint (A.18), where it regards the consumption-budget ( ιE ) and prices ( ) as 
exogenous. (Remember that the household is price-taker.) The corresponding 
Lagrange-function is given by 
ip
ιψθ ιιωιι ∀⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −= ∑∏
=
,)(ln
1 i
iiL
n
i
ii CpECLG i  
where Lψ  is the LaGrange-multiplier (shadow-price). 
The first order necessary optimality conditions are given by 
(A.19) ιψθ
ω
ιι ,,0 ipC iLii
i ∀=−−  
These conditions are also sufficient for an optimum (maximum), since the target 
function is concave and the restriction linear. (The non-negativity constraints are 
studied in the phase diagram in APPENDIX C.) 
From (A.19) and (13), we have 
 51
(A.20) ιθθω
ω ιιιι ,, i
p
CC i
i
mm
m
i
i ∀+−=  
Inserting (A.20) into (A.18) yields 
(A.21) ιω
θιι ∀−= ,
m
mmCE  
 
Intertemporal optimization 
Inserting (A.11), (A.12), (A.20) and (A.21) into (A.14)-(A.16) yields after some 
algebra: 
(A.22) ιωωι ∀+−= ,lnln(.) nn pEu  
where ∑
+=
≡
n
mi
in
1
ωω  and ∑≡
i
ii )ln(ωωω  
Now, we have determined the instantaneous utility as function of consumption-
budget (and prices). (Remember that the household is price-taker, i.e. prices are 
exogenous from the household’s point of view.) Inserting (A.22) into (A.13) yields 
(A.23) ( ) ιωω ριι ∀+−= ∫∞ − ,lnln
0
dtepEU tnn  
Thus, the intertemporal optimization problem is to optimize (A.23) subject to the 
dynamic constraint (A.17). This is a typical optimal control problem. The 
Hamiltonian for this problem is as follows: 
(A.24) [ ] ιδψωω ιιι ∀−−+++−= ,)(lnln EWrLwpEHAM Hnn  
where Hψ  is the co-state variable. ιE  is control-variable and ιW  is state variable. 
The prices ( ) and factor prices (  and np w δ−r ) are regarded by the household as 
exogenous (since the household is marginalistic and thus price-taker.) Remember 
that L  is exogenous. It may be confusing that  is time varying (while being 
regarded as exogenous in the optimal control problem of the household). However, 
this fact does not prevent us from using the Hamiltonian, since the Hamiltonian 
function allows, in general, that time enters the target function explicitly (i.e. via 
exogenous “parameters”); see e.g. Gandolfo (1996), p.375, on a general 
formulation of the control-problems which are solvable by using the Hamiltonian. 
np
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The first order optimality conditions are given by 0
!=∂
∂
ιE
HAM  and 
HHW
HAM ρψψι +=∂
∂− &! . These conditions imply (after some algebra) that 
(A.25) ιρδι
ι
∀−−= ,r
E
E&  
Note that this first order condition is also a sufficient condition for an optimum. 
This can be immediately concluded from the Hamiltonian. Equation (A.25) has the 
same concavity features as the Hamiltonian of the standard one-sector Ramsey-
Cass-Koopmans model. Especially, the target function is concave in the control-
variable and the restriction (i.e. the term within the squared brackets) is linear in 
the control and the state variable. Therefore, we know that the Hamiltonian is 
concave; therefore, the optimality conditions are sufficient. Q.E.D. 
 
Relationship between individual variables and economy-wide 
aggregates 
Aggregate consumption expenditures are given by 
(A.26)  ∑∑ ==
i
iiCpEE
ι
ι
ι
where the following relation holds: 
(A.27)  iCC ii ∀=∑ ,
ι
ι
There is no unemployment, i.e. 
(A.28) ∑=
ι
LL  
Last not least, since the wealth/assets can only be invested in production-capital 
(K), the following relation must be true 
(A.29)  ∑=
ι
ιWK
(see also, e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), p.97). That is, all assets are invested 
in capital (capital-market-clearing). 
Furthermore, the “subsistence needs” of the whole economy are simply equal to the 
sum of the subsistence needs of its individuals, i.e. 
(A.30)  iii ∀=∑ ,
ι
ιθθ
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Equation (A.20), (A.27) and (A.30) imply 
(A.31) i
p
CC i
i
mm
m
i
i ∀+−= ,θθω
ω  
This equation corresponds to equation (18). Q.E.D. Exactly speaking, inserting 
(9) into (18) yields (A.31). 
(A.25) and (A.26) imply 
(A.32) ρδ −−= r
E
E&  
This equation corresponds to equation (19). Q.E.D. Exactly speaking, (19) can 
be transformed into (A.32) by using (1), (2), (8)-(12), (17) and (18). 
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APPENDIX B 
Equations (20) to (29) are relevant for aggregate analysis. Now let us search, like in 
the “normal” Ramsey model, for a growth path where E and K grow at constant 
rate, i.e. 
(B.1) EgE
E !=&  
(B.2) KgK
K !=&  
Equations (B.1) and (22) imply that 
(B.3) .const
L
L
l
l
K
K
k
k
m
m
m
m =−−+ &&&&  
Requirement (B.3) and equation (21) imply that 
(B.4) .~
~
const
Y
Y =
&
 
(B.2) and (B.3) imply  
(B.5) ( ) .
/
/ const
lk
lk
mm
mm =&  
(B.1), (B.2) and (B.4) imply 
(B.6) ( ) .~/
~/ const
YE
YE =&  and ( ) .~/
~/ const
YK
YK =&  
Equations (B.2), (20) and (25) imply 
(B.7) 
Y
Kg
Y
H
Y
E
k
lcc K
m
m ~)(~~65 δ+++=+  
Solving equation (24) for 
Y
H
~  and inserting it into equation (B.7) yields after some 
algebra: 
(B.8) 
Y
Kg
k
l
c
c
Y
E
c
c
c
c K
m
m ~)(
1
~1
1
4
6
4
3
4
5 δ++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=−  
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Remember that  and Kgcccc ,,,, 6543 δ  are constants. Furthermore, note that 
(B.5) and (B.6) imply that 
m
m
k
l
Y
E ,~  and Y
K
~  grow at constant rate. Hence, equation 
(B.8) can be satisfied at any point of time only if 
m
m
k
l
Y
E ,~  and Y
K
~  are constant (i.e. 
they grow at the constant rate zero), i.e. 
(B.9) ..,~ constk
lconst
Y
E
m
m == , .~ constY
K =  
Equations (B.9), (23), (25) imply 
(B.10) .~
~
const
H
H
Y
Y
K
K
Y
Y
E
E ===== &&&
&&
 
Q.E.D. 
Let  denote the constant growth rate from equation (B.10). Hence, (B.9), (B.10), 
(21) and (26) imply 
*g
(B.11) Lgq
G
G
g +−= 1
*
&
 
Inserting equations (27) and (28) into equation (B.11) yields after some algebra: 
(B.12) LBA g
ggg ++−
+−= χεγαεμ
εγεμ
)1(
)1(*  
Q.E.D. 
Note that in all the calculations from above we searched for an equilibrium growth 
path where E and K grow at constant rate. As a result we obtained that H grows at 
constant rate along this growth path. Hence, we can treat H like exogenous 
technological progress along this growth path. Let HYY −≡ˆ . In this case equation 
(20) can be written as follows: 
(B.13)  EKKY ++= δ&ˆ
Q.E.D. 
Inserting equations (21), (23) and (25) into HYY −≡ˆ  yields: 
(B.14) qq KLGY −= 1~ˆ  
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where ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡
m
m
q
m
m
k
lcccc
l
kGG )(~ 2615 γγ  grows at constant positive rate due to 
(B.9) (G~  grows at constant positive rate). Q.E.D. 
Inserting equation (B.14) into equation (22) yields: 
(B.15) ρδλ −−=
K
Y
E
E ˆ&  
where ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−≡
m
m
m
m
k
lcccc
k
l )( 2615 γγβλ  is constant due to (B.9). Q.E.D. 
Equations (B.14) and (B.15) include the term . This term is constant along 
the equilibrium growth path and can be derived as function of model parameters by 
setting equation (22) equal to  and solving afterwards for  
mm kl /
*g mm kl / :
(B.16) 
K
LGg
l
k qq
m
m −−⎟⎟⎠
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⎛ ++= 1
1
1
1
*
β
ρδ  
Note that the term LG q−1
1
 is a function of exogenous parameters and grows at rate 
 (see equation (B.11) for ). K grows at rate  along the equilibrium growth 
path as well (see Lemma 1). Hence, the term 
*g *g *g
K
LG q−1
1
 is constant along the 
equilibrium growth path; thus, we can rewrite equation (B.16) in terms of initial 
values of exogenous parameters (the index zero denotes the initial value of the 
corresponding variable): 
(B.17) 
0
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1
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1
*
)(
K
LGg
l
k qq
m
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⎛ ++= β
ρδ  
where q,  and are given by equations (27), (28) and (B.12). Q.E.D. 0G
*g
We have shown now that along an equilibrium growth path where E and K grow at 
constant rate H grows at constant rate as well and  is constant. When this 
fact is taken into account, the economy in aggregates is represented by equations 
(B.13)-(B.15). These equations are similar to the Ramsey-model regarding all 
relevant features; hence, they imply that this equilibrium growth path exists and is 
unique. Q.E.D. 
mm lk /
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APPENDIX C 
First, we show by using linear approximation that the saddle-path-feature of the 
PBGP is given (Proposition 1a). Then we prove local stability by using a phase 
diagram (Proposition 1b). 
 
Existence of a saddle-path (Proposition 1a) 
First we rearrange the aggregate equation system (20)-(29) as follows: 
(C.1) K
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k
l
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where aggregate variables are expressed in “labor-efficiency units”, i.e. they are 
divided by qLG −1
1
; hence 
qLG
KK
−
≡
1
1
ˆ  and 
qLG
EE
−
≡
1
1
ˆ . Furthermore,  is the 
growth rate of G given by (28) and 
Gg
∑
+=
≡
n
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in
1
ωω . 
These equations imply that  and  have the following values along the 
PBGP 
EK ˆ,ˆ mm kl /
(C.4) 
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where 
q
gg GL −+++
≡
1
ρδ
βσ  
where an asterisk denotes the PBGP-value of the corresponding variable. 
The proof of local saddle-path-stability of the PBGP is analogous to the proof by 
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) (see there for details and see also Acemoglu 
(2009), pp. 269-273, 926). 
First, we have to show that the determinant of the Jacobian of the differential 
equation system (C.1)-(C.2) (where  is given by equation (C.3)) is different 
from zero when evaluated at the PBGP (i.e. for 
mm kl /
*
** ,ˆ,ˆ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎛
m
m
k
l
EK  from equations 
(C.4)-(C.6)). This implies that this differential equation system is hyperbolic and 
can be linearly approximated around 
*
** ,ˆ,ˆ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
m
m
k
lEK  (Grobman-Hartman-Theorem; 
see as well Acemoglu (2009), p. 926, and Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008)). The 
determinant of the Jacobian is given by: 
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The derivatives of equations (C.1)-(C.2) are given by: 
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(C.8)  
E
k
l
k
lqKE
q
ggK
k
l
E
E
K
k
l
k
l
Kq
k
l
KqE
K
E
E
k
l
k
l
q
k
l
qK
E
K
q
gg
K
k
l
k
lq
k
lqK
k
l
k
l
Kq
K
K
m
m
q
m
mq
G
L
q
q
m
m
m
m
q
m
mq
q
m
mq
m
m
q
m
m
q
m
mq
G
L
m
m
q
m
m
q
m
mq
q
m
m
q
m
mq
ˆ)1(
ˆˆ
1
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ)1(ˆ)1(ˆˆ
ˆ
1ˆ)1(
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
1ˆ
)1(ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
∂
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛∂
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−−−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=∂
∂
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∂
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛∂
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−=∂
∂
−∂
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛∂
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−=∂
∂
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−++−∂
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛∂
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=∂
∂
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−−−
−−−
−−
−
β
ρδβ
β
βα
δβα
βα
&
&
&
&
 
where the derivatives of equation (C.3) are given by  
(C.9)
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Inserting the derivatives (C.8) and (C.9) into (C.7) and inserting the PBGP-values 
from equations (C.4)-(C.6) yields after some algebra the following value of the 
determinant of the Jacobian evaluated at the PBGP: 
(C.10) 
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where ( ) 0>−+≡ αμχγεαα  and q is given by equation (27). 
This equation can be transformed further by using equations (27) and (C.4)-(C.6): 
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m
m
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l are positive and are given 
by equations (C.4)-(C.6). Furthermore, note that following relations, which are 
useful for deriving equation (C.11), are true: εμγγβα )(1 −+−=+ ,  βα
β
+=q  
(from (27)) and 
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 (from (C.6)). 
We can see that the determinant evaluated at PBGP is different form zero. Hence, 
the PBGP is hyperbolic. Furthermore, equations (C.10) and (C.11) imply that 
0* <J . (Equation (C.10) implies that 0* <J , if 0>−ανχβ ; equation (C.11) 
implies that 0* <J , if 0<−ανχβ  as well.) 
Our differential equation system consists of two differential equations ((C.1) and 
(C.2)) and of two variables ( Eˆ  and Kˆ ), where we have one state and one control-
variable. Hence, saddle-path-stability of the PBGP requires that there exist one 
negative (and one positive) eigenvalue of the differential equation system when 
evaluated at PBGP (see also Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) and Acemoglu (2009), 
pp. 269-273). Since 0* <J  we can be sure that this is the case. ( 0* <J  can exist 
only if one eigenvalue is positive and the other eigenvalue is negative. If both 
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eigenvalues were negative or if both eigenvalues were positive, the determinant 
*J  would be positive.) Therefore, the PBGP is locally saddle-path-stable, i.e. 
Proposition 1a is proved. Q.E.D. 
 
Local stability (Proposition 1b) 
In the following, we omit intermediates for simplicity, i.e. we set 0== μγ . 
Furthermore, we study here only the case where output-elasticity of capital in 
investment goods industries (i=m) is relatively low in comparison to the output-
elasticity of capital in the consumption goods industries ( mi ≠∀ ), i.e. we assume 
αχ < . This is consistent with the empirical evidence presented and discussed in 
Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) (see there especially p.826). Note, however, that 
the qualitative stability results for the other case (i.e. αχ > ) are the same. 
To show the stability-features of the PBGP, the three-dimensional system (C.1)-
(C.3) has to be transformed into a two dimensional system, in order to allow us 
using a phase-diagram. By defining the variable 
m
m
l
kKˆ≡κ , the system (C.1)-(C.3) 
can be reformulated as follows (after some algebra): 
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≡
n
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ωω  
We can focus attention on showing that the stationary point of this differential 
equation system is stable: The discussion in APPENDIX B implies that κ  and Eˆ  
are jointly in steady state only if Kˆ , Eˆ  and  are jointly in steady state and 
that 
mm lk /
Kˆ , Eˆ  and  are jointly in steady state only if mm lk / κ  and Eˆ  are jointly in 
steady state. Therefore, the proof of stability of the stationary point of system 
(C.12)-(C.13) implies stability of the stationary point of system (C.1)-(C.3). Hence, 
 62
in the following we will prove stability of the stationary point of system (C.12)-
(C.13). 
It follows from equations (C.12) and (C.13) that the steady-state-loci of the two 
variables are given by 
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Now, we could depict the differential equation system (C.12)-(C.13) in the phase 
space ( ). Before doing so, we show that not the whole phase space ( ) is 
economically meaningful. The economically meaningful phase-space is restricted 
by three curves ( ), as shown in the following figure and as derived below: 
κ,Eˆ κ,Eˆ
321 ,, tt RRR
 
Figure C.1: Relevant space of the phase diagram 
 
κ
Eˆ  
1R  
3
0=tR  
2
0=tR  
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Only the space below the 1R -line is economically meaningful, since the 
employment-share of at least one sub-sector i is negative in the space above the 
1R -line. This can be seen from the following fact: 
It follows from equations (1), (2), (3) and (17) after some algebra that 
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Note that αχανχβ −=−  when 0== μγ . 
Since,  cannot be negative (hence , ) this equation implies that il 10
1
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n
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(C.15) χβ
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l  
Inserting equation (24) into this relation yields 
(C.16) βκωχ
α
n
ER 1ˆ:1 <  
(remember that in equation (24) H=0, due to (23) and 0== μγ ). 
Hence, the space above 1R  is not feasible. When the economy reaches a point on 
1R , no labour is used in sub-sectors i=1,…m. If we impose Inada-conditions on the 
production functions, as usual, this means that the output of sub-sectors i=1,…m is 
equal to zero, which means that the consumption of these sectors is equal to zero. 
Our utility function implies that life-time utility is infinitely negative in this case. 
Hence, the household prefers not to be at the 1R -curve. Note that actually the 1R -
curve is only an outer limit: Since we have existence-minima in our utility 
function, the utility function becomes infinitely negative when the consumption of 
one of these goods falls below its subsistence level. Hence, even when the 
consumption of all goods is positive, it may be the case that the utility function is 
infinitely negative due to violation of some existence minima. Therefore, the actual 
constraint is somewhere below the 1R -curve. However, this fact does not change 
the qualitative results of the stability analysis. 
Now we turn to the  and -curves. We have to take account of the non-
negativity-constraints on consumption (
2
tR
3
tR
iCi ∀> 0 ), since our Stone-Geary-type 
utility function can give rise to negative consumption. By using equations (A.1), 
(A.2) (A.11) and (A.12) from APPENDIX A and equations (27) and (28) the non-
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negativity-constraints ( iCi ∀> 0 ) can be transformed as follows (remember that 
we assume here 0== μγ ):  
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This set of constraints implies that at any point of time only two constraints are 
binding, namely those with respectively the largest 
i
i
ω
θ− . Hence, the set (C.17), 
(C.18) can be reduced to the following set: 
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These constraints are time-dependent. It depends upon the parameter setting 
whether  or whether  is binding at a point of time. In Figure C.1 we have 
depicted examples for these constraints for the initial state of the system. Only the 
space above the constraints is economically meaningful, since below the 
constraints the consumption of at least one good is negative. Last not least, note 
that equations (C.19)/(C.20) imply that the -curve and the -curve converge to 
the axes of the phase-diagram as time approaches infinity.  
2
tR
3
tR
2
tR
3
tR
Now, we depict the differential equation system (C.12)-(C.13) in the phase space 
( ). κ,Eˆ
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Figure C.2: The differential equation system (C.12)-(C.13) in the phase-space for 
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κ
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*κ  
0=κ&  0ˆ =E&  
S 
saddle-path 
κ  T poleκ
0=κ&  
0κ  
R 
 
Note that we have depicted here only the relevant (or: binding) parts of the 
restriction-set of Figure C.1 as a bold line R. 
As we can see, the 0=κ& -locus has a pole at βχαρω
αβκ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−=
1
1
)(n
pole . 
The phase diagram implies that there must be a saddle-path along which the system 
converges to the stationary point S (where S is actually the PBGP). The length of 
the saddle-path is restricted by the restrictions of the meaningful space  
(bold line). In other words, only if the initial 
321 ,, tt RRR
κ  ( 0κ ) is somewhere between 0κ  and 
κ 9, the economy can be on the saddle-path. Therefore, the system can be only 
                                                 
9 Note that κ  must be somewhat smaller than depicted in this diagram, since, as discussed above, 
1R -curve is only an „outer limit“. 
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locally saddle-path stable. Now, we have to show that the system will be on the 
saddle-path if κκκ << 00 . Furthermore, we have to discuss what happens if 0κ  is 
not within this range. 
Every trajectory, which starts above the saddle-path or left from 0κ  , reaches the 
1R -curve in finite time. As discussed above, the life-time utility becomes infinitely 
negative if the household reaches the 1R -curve. These arguments imply that the 
representative household will never choose to start above the saddle path if 
κκκ << 00 , since all the trajectories above the saddle-path lead to a state where 
life-time-utility is infinitely negative. 
Furthermore, all initial points which are situated below the saddle-path or right 
from κ  converge to the point T. If the system reaches one of the constraints 
( ) during this convergence process, it moves along the binding constraint 
towards T. However, the transversality condition is violated in T. Therefore, T is 
not an equilibrium. To see that the transversality condition is violated in T consider 
the following facts: The transversality condition is given by , where 
32 , tt RR
0lim >−∞→
t
t
Ke ρψ
ψ  is the costate variable in the Hamiltonian function (shadow-price of capital; see 
also APPENDIX A). By using the equations from APPENDIX A this transversality 
condition can be reformulated such that we obtain: 0
1
lim 1 >−−−−
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β G
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. However, equation (C.13a) 
implies that in point T in Figure C.2 
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. Hence, the 
transversality condition is violated if the system converges to point T.  
 
Overall, we know that, if κκκ << 00 , the household always decides to be on the 
saddle-path. Hence, we know that for κκκ << 00  the economy converges to the 
PBGP. In this sense, the PBGP is locally stable (within the range κκκ << 00 ). 
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If the initial capital is to small ( 00 κκ < ), the economy converges to a state where 
some existence minima are not satisfied (curve 1R ) and thus utility becomes 
infinitely negative. This may be interpreted as a development trap. For example, 
Malthusian theories imply that in this case some part of the population dies, which 
would yield an increase in per-capita-capital (and hence an increase in 0κ ). 
On the other hand, if initial capital-level is too large ( κκ >0 ), all trajectories 
violate the transversality condition. Therefore, in this case, the representative 
household must waste a part of its initial capital to come into the feasible area 
( κκκ << 00 ). This case may be interpreted as “development trap of the rich”. 
Furthermore, note that there are always some happenings which reduce the capital 
stock, e.g. wars (like the Second World War) or natural catastrophes. These 
happenings could shift the economy into feasible space ( κκκ << 00 ). These 
thoughts could be analyzed further in order to develop a theory that the Second 
World War is the reason for the fact that many economies satisfy the Kaldor-facts 
today. 
The alternative is to assume that the transversality condition needs not to hold 
necessarily. In this case the point T would be an equilibrium. All economies which 
start at κκ >0  would converge to this equilibrium. However, we have no idea of 
how we could omit the transversality condition. We know that the transversality 
condition implies that the value of capital is not allowed to be negative at the 
household’s death (at infinity). In the actual model, there seems to be no adequate 
theory of allowing for the violation of the transversality condition. 
Note that equation (C.3) and definition 
m
m
l
kKˆ≡κ  imply that κ  is a strictly 
monotonously increasing function of K  in the relevant space of the phase 
diagram (ceteris paribus). Hence, the κ -ranges which determine the ranges of 
the “development trap”, the local stability and the “development trap of the rich” 
can be directly transformed into K -ranges. That is, if initial capital ( ) is 
relatively low, the economy is in the “development trap”; if  is relatively high, 
the economy is in the “development trap of the rich”; if  is somewhere in-
between the economy is in the space of local stability. 
0K
0K
0K
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Furthermore, note that Figure C.2 depicts the phase diagram for parameter 
constellations, which satisfy the condition 
βδ
χαρω
αβ
−++
<−
1
1
)( G
L
n
gg
. For 
parameter constellations, which satisfy the condition 
βδ
χαρω
αβ
−++
>−
1
1
)( G
L
n
gg
, the discussion and the qualitative results are nearly 
the same. The only difference is that the 0=κ& -locus is hump-shaped (concave) for 
poleκκ < . However, all the qualitative results remain the same (local stability of 
PBGP for some range κκκ << 00  and “infeasibility” for 00 κκ <  and κκ >0 ). 
Q.E.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 69
APPENDIX D 
It follows from the optimality condition (18) that 
(D.1) i
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For the sake of simplicity we consider only the non-homotheticity between the 
services sector and the conglomerate of the agriculture and manufacturing sector. 
Inserting equation (D.1) into equations (15) yields (remember equation (10)): 
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. Note that p is given by ∑
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∂∂=  and stands for the relative 
price of sub-sectors . nmi ,...1+=
If preferences are non-homothetic across sectors consumption expenditures on 
agriculture and manufacturing ( ) do not grow at the same rate as 
consumption expenditures on services ( ), when treating relative prices as 
constants. Hence, we have to show that  and  do not grow at the same 
rate when treating -  as constants. It follows from equations (D.2) and (D.3) 
that, when treating -  as constants, the following equations are true 
.. managrE +
.serE
.. managrE + .serE
1d 4d
1d 4d
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which shows that  and  do not grow at the same rate when treating -
 as constants, i.e., preferences are non-homothetic between the services sector 
and the conglomerate of the agriculture sector. In the same way it can be shown 
that preferences are non-homothetic between the manufacturing sector and the 
agriculture sector. Q.E.D. 
.. managrE + .serE 1d
4d
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APPENDIX E 
The optimality condition (17) implies after some algebra that 
(E.1) i
p
Hh
i
ii ∀= ,ε  
Hence, 
(E.2) 
i
j
j
i
j
i
p
p
h
h
ε
ε=   for sai ,...1+=   and  nsj ,...1+=  
In equation (E.2) i stands for the manufacturing sector and j for the services sector. 
Let us now take a look at an arbitrary producer of the manufacturing sector, e.g. the 
producer i = 3, where a+1<3 < s.  we rewrite equation (E.2) as follows to show the 
viewpoint of “producer 3”: 
(E.3) 
3
33
p
p
h
h j
jj ε
ε=   for nsj ,...1+=  
From the view point of “producer 3” equation (E.3) determines the ratio between 
the input of own intermediates (i.e. the amount of intermediates which is produced 
by “producer 3” and used by “producer 3”) and input of services-sector-produced 
intermediates (i.e. the amount of intermediates which is produced by “producer j” 
from the services sector and used by “producer 3”). (Remember that  and  
enter the production function of “producer 3” via equations (1) and (7).) Hence, for 
example, a decrease in 
3h jh
jh
h3  means that “producer 3” increases the input of 
producer-j-intermediates relatively more strongly than the input of own 
intermediates, i.e. “producer 3” substitutes own intermediate inputs by external 
intermediate inputs, i.e. “producer 3” outsources additional intermediates 
production to producer j. Therefore, we can conclude from equation (E.3) that 
“producer 3” outsources more and more to “producer j” (i.e. 
jh
h3  decreases), 
provided that 0
3
3 <−
p
p
p
p
j
j &&  (i.e. provided that the price for the good j in terms of 
the good 3 )(
3p
p j decreases; or in other words: provided that the output of “producer 
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j” becomes cheaper and cheaper (or less and less expensive) in comparison to the 
output of “producer 3”). 
From this discussion and from equation (E.2) we can conclude the following: 
manufacturing-sector-producers ( sai ,...1+= ) shift more and more intermediates 
production to services-sector-producers ( nsj ,...1+= ), i.e. 
j
i
h
h  decreases, provided 
that services-sector-production becomes cheaper and cheaper (or less and less 
expensive) in comparison to manufacturing-production, i.e. provided that 
0<−
i
i
j
j
p
p
p
p &&
, and vice versa. Q.E.D. 
Note that relative prices are determined by exogenous parameters. Hence, which 
producers outsource and whether outsourcing from manufacturing to services 
increases (or the other way around) depends on the parameterization of the model. 
In general both cases are possible. By using optimality condition (17) the relative 
prices can be calculated, so that we can reformulate equation (E.2) after some 
algebra as follows 
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From equation (E.5) we can see that some of the manufacturing sector producers 
(i.e. producers ) do not change their outsourcing behavior (i.e. these 
producers keep their ratio of external to own intermediates production (
smi ,...1+=
j
i
h
h
) 
constant). Equation (E.4) implies that the rest of the manufacturing sector 
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producers (i.e. the producers mai ,...1+= ) change their outsourcing behavior. 
Calculating the growth rate of equation (E.4) yields (remember Lemma 1): 
(E.6) 
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ϖ ,  and D  are positive. We omit here a detailed discussion of *g D /&
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, 
since it is less relevant for our purposes. The only important thing is that 
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can be positive (e.g. if 0,0 >−>− νβBA gg  and 0>− μγ ) or negative (e.g. if 
0,0 <−<− νβBA gg  and 0<− μγ ) depending on the parameterization of the 
model. Hence, the intermediates-production may be shifted from manufacturing to 
services or the other way around, depending on the parameterization of the model. 
Q.E.D. 
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APPENDIX F 
It is well known that balanced growth requires either labor-augmenting 
technological progress (or production function(s) of type Cobb-Douglas.) 
Furthermore, a standard assumption in macroeconomic models is that the 
production function has constant returns to scale. (Later, we will see that the 
aggregate production function has the same structure as the sectoral production 
functions.) Since we want to reassess the standard growth theory we do not depart 
from these assumptions. Therefore, we assume now that sectoral production 
functions are given by: 
(1)’ ( ) niLflBY iiiii ,...1       =∀Ω=  
where 
(26)’ ni
LBl
Kk
ii
i
i ,...1     =∀≡Ω  
iB  stands for the level of sector-specific and labor augmenting technological 
progress; is a sector-specific function of )( iif Ω iΩ ; it is the intensive form of a 
“standard” constant returns to scale function, where in this appendix  denotes 
the capital-to-labor ratio in efficiency units in sector i. 
iΩ
The sectoral growth rates of labor-augmenting technological progress ( ) are 
constant, i.e. . The following equations remain the same as in the 
previous discussion: 
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We still assume that sector m is numéraire (m<n) (although we do not make here 
any assumptions about which sector produces capital). Hence, equation (13) holds. 
When labor and capital are mobile across sectors and markets are polypolistic the 
following efficiency conditions must be true:  
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Note that we do not make here any assumption about the household behavior. 
The assumptions above are sufficient to derive Proposition 4. 
The capital share of income in sector i (or: the elasticity of capital with respect to 
output in sector i) is given by: 
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By inserting equations (1)’, (26)’ and (13) into equation (32)’ we obtain:  
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Inserting first equations (1)’ and (26)’ into equation (17)’ and then inserting 
equation (F.1) into this term yields: 
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Solving this term for  and inserting it into equation (3)’ yields (remember that ik
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Equations (13) and (17)’ imply: 
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Inserting equations (1)’, (F.1) and (F.5) into equation (12)’ yields:  
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Inserting equation (F.4) into equation (F.6) yields equation  
(F.7)   [ ] ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Ω−+ΩΩ
Ω=
m
mm
tmmm
m
mm
l
kf
K
Y )(1)()( κκ   
Definition F.1: A PBGP is a growth path where 
K
Y  and 
Y
rK  are constant. 
Definition F.1 is consistent with Definition 1 (and with the Kaldor facts). In fact 
both definitions yield the same equilibrium growth path (but Definition 1 is 
stronger than necessary). However, now we use Definition F.1 in order to 
demonstrate that the necessary condition for the PBGP is independent of the 
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numéraire. (Remember that, since 
K
Y  and 
Y
rK  are ratios, they are always the same 
irrespective of the choice of the numérarire.) 
Lemma F.1: A necessary condition for the existence of a PBGP (according to 
Definition F.1) is  or equivalently ./ constkl mm = .)(1 const
l
i ii
i =Ω−∑ κ .  
Proof: Definition F.1 requires that 
K
Y  and 
Y
rK  are constant; hence r must be 
constant; hence  must be constant (due to equation (F.2)). Due to equation 
(F.7),  and 
mΩ
.constm =Ω .constK
Y =  require ./ constkl mm = .  and 
 require 
./ constkl mm =
.constm =Ω .)(1 const
l
i ii
i =Ω−∑ κ  (due to equation (F.4)). Note that 
iii λκ =Ω− )(1 , since we assume that there are only two production factors capital 
and labor. ( iλ  stands for the output-elasticity of labor in sector i or equivalently for 
the labor-income share in sector i.) Q.E.D. 
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